# **1AC**

## 1AC Plan

Plan: The United States federal government should normalize its economic relations with The Republic of Cuba.

## 1AC Black Feminism

Black Feminist epistemology is the key internal link to the empowerment of all genders

Patricia 91

Collins Patricia 91, Professor of Sociology University of Maryland, [Black Feminist](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Feminist) Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment P 280

When it comes to knowledge, Black women’s empowerment involves rejecting the dimensions of knowledge that perpetuate objectification, commodification, and exploitation. African-American women and others like us become empowered when we understand and use those dimensions of our individual, group, and formal educational ways of knowing that foster our humanity. When Black women value our self-definitions, participate in Black women’s domestic and transnational activist traditions, view the skills gained in schools as part of a focused education for Black community development, and invoke Black feminist epistemologies as central to our worldviews, we empower ourselves. C.Wright Mills’s (1959) concept of the “sociological imagination” Identifies its task and its promise as a way of knowing that enables individuals to grasp the relations between history and biography within society. Resembling the holistic epistemology required by Black feminism, using one’s point of view to engage the sociological imagination can empower the individual.“My fullest concentration of energy is available to me,”Audre Lorde maintains, “only when I integrate all the parts of who I am,openly, allowing power from particular sources of my living to flow back and forth freely through all my different selves, without the restriction of externally imposed definition”(1984,120–21).Developing a Black women’s standpoint to engage a collective Black feminist imagination can empower the group

Our endorsement of black feminist epistemology solves

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Black women’s empowerment involves revitalizing U.S.Black feminism as a social justice project organized around the dual goals of empowering African American women and fostering social justice in a transnational context. Black feminist thought’s emphasis on the ongoing interplay between Black women’s oppression and Black women’s activism presents the matrix of domination and its interrelated domains of power as responsive to human agency. Such thought views the world as a dynamic place where the goal is not merely to survive or to fit in or to cope; rather, it becomes a place where we feel ownership and accountability. The existence of Black feminist thought suggests that there is always choice, and power to act, no matter how bleak the situation may appear to be. Viewing the world as one in the making raises the issue of individual responsibility for bringing about change. It also shows that while individual empowerment is key, only collective action can effectively generate the lasting institutional transformation required for social justice

Embargo-caused shortages of contraceptives cause abortion, teen pregnancy, and HIV

Lundy 13, and Therese Jennissen, Colleen Lundy School of Social Work, Carleton University Associate Professor, supervisor of doctoral studies, Ph. D, teaches Women, Male Violence and Social change Direct Intervention: individuals, Families and Groups Foundations of Structural Analysis, Social Welfare and Social Work http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277539501001637

Cuban women are affected by the serious shortage of reliable contraceptives. Although access to contraceptives is a fundamental right, shortages of products such as condoms have necessitated a reliance on abortion (Aguilar & Pereira, 1995), and have led to a rise in teenage pregnancies (Catasús Cervera, 1996) and HIV infections in Cuban women (Dı́az Alonzo, Sintes, & Fernández, 1995). There is a growing concern over the increase in numbers of teen mothers who now represent 25% of new mothers. This rate, one of the highest rates worldwide, exceeds the rate of 14% in both Costa Rica and Nicaragua (Neft & Levine, 1997, p. 111).

The Cuban Embargo creates contraceptive shortages that foist a choice of either pregnancy or abortion onto women

Walker 98 S. Lynne Copley News Service, won the 2006 National Reporting prize, *Abortions have become a part of life for many Cuban women* text copy

Alensay Perez had an abortion the day after Christmas. It was her fifth abortion in 10 years.¶ The unemployed, single mother can't afford to have more children. So she will have more abortions instead.¶ Although Pope John Paul II has repeatedly condemned Cuba's practice of legal abortions during his five-day visit, Perez and hundreds of thousands of other Cuban women see abortion as the only way to keep their families small.¶ Contraceptives are scarce in this island nation isolated from the rest of the world by the U.S. embargo and Fidel Castro's Communist regime. And abortions are provided free of charge at government-run hospitals.¶ John Paul accused the Castro government of fomenting ''anti-birth mentality'' under ''the guise of freedom and progress.''¶ The Pope is expected to speak out against sexual promiscuity and deteriorating family values during his final Mass Sunday (Jan. 25) in Havana.¶ Perez will be at the Mass. Her 10-year-old daughter, the only child Perez says she'll ever have, will be listening too.¶ ''There should not be so many abortions,'' the soft-spoken, 24-year-old woman says. ''Women should take care of themselves.'' ¶ Cuba has the highest abortion rate in Latin America.¶ In this nation of 11 million people, Cuba's top public health official says there is one abortion for every child born.¶ That means there were 152,547 abortions and an equal number of births in Cuba last year.¶ Abortions have been permitted by the Cuban government for the past 20 years. Since then, more than 3 million have been performed.¶ Before Cuba made abortions legal, women were dying from back-room operations done ''in a humiliating and clandestine way,'' said Dr. Mirna Ortega, a specialist in obstetrics.¶ The decision to lift the ban was ''an emancipation of the Cuban woman,'' she said.¶ In recent years, however, government doctors become increasingly concerned about the soaring number of abortions.¶ More and more sexually active teen-age girls are having abortions to terminate unwanted pregnancies...''The government is not in agreement with abortion. It is not the method we recommend,'' said Ortega. ''But it is a woman's right.''¶ Ortega, a plump, middle-aged woman with a soothing voice, offers family planning at a government clinic near downtown Havana.¶ She teaches women about birth control methods, counsels couples to plan their families, and gives out contraceptives to those who want to put off having children.¶ Ortega admits her job is sometimes difficult because contraceptives are scarce.¶ The economic embargo has severely limited medicines entering Cuba. Sometimes women get pregnant because the government does not have enough contraceptives to hand out.¶ ''We do not have abundance. We are trying to control, to regulate the supply because of our economic situation,'' says Ortega. ''You have to be a doctor working directly with people to feel the inhumanity of this.'' Despite the shortage of contraceptives, Ortega says the family planning program has reduced abortions. Since 1990, the abortion rate at her clinic has fallen 60 percent, she says.¶ But doctors at other government-run hospitals say the abortion rate is still disturbingly high.¶ ''Adolescents regard abortion as just one more contraceptive,'' said Dr. Georgina Areces, a gynecology and obstetrics specialist at a hospital in Havana.¶ When the Cuban government made abortions legal, it failed to educate women about sex, contraceptives and conception.¶ ''We need sex education that is profound. Not just one little class,'' Areces said. ''It has to be more realistic than that.''¶ At the noisy, run-down hospital where Areces works, hundreds of women get abortions each year.¶ She talks to her patients about the medical risks of abortions and methods of preventing pregnancy. But when Areces speaks to teen-agers, ''it goes in one ear and out the other,'' she said.¶ When the girls get pregnant, their mothers who have often had abortions themselves take them to the hospital to terminate their pregnancies.¶ Over the past several years, the age of girls seeking abortions has steadily dropped.¶ Abortions ''are being abused,'' Areces said. ''You don't want people to act like they're indigenous. You want them act responsibly.'' ¶ Dr. Conchita Morales wants to halt abortions in Cuba…The couple works with the Catholic Church to convince pregnant women who are considering abortions to put their babies up for adoption.¶ ''There are people who want to adopt children. But here, no one gives up their child,'' Morales said. ''If they don't want the child, they abort.''¶ Cuban women see abortions as a quick, simple remedy.¶ A Catholic nun, who devotes most of her time to working with pregnant women, says abortions have become a normal part of Cubans' reproductive lives.¶ ''They have created a culture where people think having an abortion is like pulling a tooth,'' she said.

Withholding contraception is immoral and patriarchal—denies right to choose

Harrison 81, Beverly Wildung. Professor of Christian ethics, Union Theological Seminary, New York. Won multiple awards and recognitions for contribution to studies on female sociology, famous for unique brand of feminism that redefines the Christian mindset. *Theology of Pro-Choice: A Feminist Perspective* in *The Witness,* Vol. 64, Nos. 7 and 8. Book

A treatment of any moral problem is inadequate if it fails to analyze the morality of a given act in a way that represents the concrete experience of the agent who faces a decision with respect to this act. Misogyny in Christian discussions of contraception is evidenced clearly in that the contraception decision is never treated in the way it arises as part of the female agent's life process. The decision at issue when the dilemma of choice arises for women is whether or not to be pregnant. In most discussions of the morality of contraception it is treated as an abstract act, rather than as a possible way we deal with a pregnancy, which, frequently, is the result of circumstances beyond the woman's control. In any pregnancy a woman's life is deeply, irrevocably affected. Those who uphold the unexceptional immorality of contraception are probably wise to obscure the fact that an unwanted pregnancy always involves a life-shaping consequence for a woman, because suppressing the identity of the moral agent and the reality of her dilemma greatly reduces the ability to recognize the moral complexity of abortion. When the question of abortion arises it is usually because a woman finds herself facing an unwanted pregnancy. Consider the actual circumstances that may precipitate this. One is the situation in which a woman did not intend to be sexually active or did not intend into a sexual activity. Since women are frequently victims of sexual violence, numerous cases of this type arise because of rape, incest, or forced marital coitus. Many morally sensitive opponents of contraception concede that in such cases contraception may be morally justifiable. I insist that in such cases it is a moral good, because it is not rational to treat a newly fertilized ovum as though it had the same value as the existent, pregnant, female person, and because it is morally wrong to make the victim of sexual violence suffer the further agonies of unwanted pregnancy and childbearing against her will. Enforced pregnancy is a morally reprehensible violation of bodily integrity if women were recognized as fully human moral agents. Another more frequent case results when a woman -or usually a young girl- anticipates in heterosexual activity without clear knowledge of how pregnancy occurs and without intention to conceive a child. A girl who became pregnant in this manner would, by traditional natural-law morality, be held to be in a state of invincible ignorance and therefore not morally culpable. One scholarly Roman Catholic nun I met argued -quite appropriately, I believe- that her Church should not consider young Catholic girls who use contraception as morally culpable because the Church overly protected them, which contributed to their tack of understanding procreation or to their inability to cope with the sexual pressures girls experience in contemporary society.

Embargo destroys employment which is the root cause of prostitution

Karseeboom, 3(Jennifer Karsseboom, 3/26/3, “Poverty Pushes Cuban Women into Sex Tourism”, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/211/44367.html>. EJW.)

From north to south, Havana to Santiago de Cuba, amidst the decaying buildings, propagandizing billboards and food stores with empty shelves there are two things in Cuba which are always in full supply: prostitutes and sex tourists. In a country with few employment options that offer enough upon which to subsist and an embargo that contributes to substandard living conditions for the majority of the population, women and girls flock to densely populated Havana in search of sexual employment in hotels, bars, restaurants and on the streets. Sex tourists flock to Havana and other cities in search of a form of escapism that is cheap, safe and exotic. In Cuba, foreign men can command Cuban women and girls with the same ease used to order cocktails.

Embargo is the root cause of Cuban sex tourism—blockade’s economic imperialism over Cuba and suppression of Cuban economy forces women—in particular Afro-Cuban women—to prostitute themselves in order to make a living

Lecland 10/3/13

Inès Lecland is a freelance writer for PB.“Prostitution: Cuba’s Real Tourist Attraction.” The Political Bouillion.

<http://thepoliticalbouillon.com/en/prostitution-in-cuba/>. EJW.)

Cuba: a country known for its beauty, its history, its culture, and its unique heritage and system. However, Cuba is also known for the prevalence of prostitution, which represents a black mark on its otherwise vibrant cultural landscape. While little statistical data is known, the issue of the alarming growth and ambiguity of the prostitution sector in Cuba has recently been put forth internationally, in August 2013, by the UN Committee on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.¶ In the early 1900s, prostitution was a rampant problem in Cuba, a country that was commonly called the “Brothel of the Caribbean”. After the 1959 revolution, following José Martí’s sociopolitical model – which proposed education as a means to advance Cuba and Latin America as a whole – the Castro administration implemented new policies to eliminate prostitution, gender inequalities, and racism, while focusing more directly on education, poverty and job opportunities for women. While Fidel Castro’s 1959 communist government succeeded in outlawing prostitution at first, **Cuba saw a new rise in prostitution** in 1991. This was largely **caused by the US blockade, which led to economic stagnation**, and was also due to the fall of the Soviet Union, the source of Cuba’s most significant support. Rather than thriving as a state whose purpose was to create a better and fairer society for its citizens, **Cuba** rapidly **deteriorated economically, socially, and politically.** This popular unrest was illustrated by the 1994 mass exodus, in which tens of thousands of Cubans fled the country. **The government** thus **resorted to** opening up and **promoting tourism to funnel** hard **currency into Cuba**.¶ Like citizens in many poor countries, **Cubans** have **resorted** to jineterismo – a tourist-related strain of the black market – in order to obtain a sustainable source of income. The most common form of jineterismo in Cuba has become **prostitution**; **prostitution is not only rampant**, it has enabled the country to have the largest and most thriving sex tourism sectors in the Americas. **Many citizens have turned to prostitution in order to make a sufficient living**, **to feed families,** or more drastically, to get out of the country. With an average salary at around $20/month, **women can make a much greater salary as prostitutes** rather than by working state jobs (such as cigar rolling, or nursing). **Cases where underage girls have been pushed into prostitution by relatives are not unheard of.** Additionally, **mostly Afrocuban women engage in prostitution**, **increasing** not only a **gender** issue, but also issues of **race and class**. Since prostitution is so common, it has also become a social norm in Cuba and no taboo is attached to it. Although the government has taken some steps towards the elimination of prostitution, it seems that other issues have changed the political agenda, since the government has continued to turn a blind eye to the matter. The causal factors associated with prostitution are deeply embedded within Cuban society; for instance, it has been reported that **sex workers have maintained relationships with pimps who pay off police officers**. For the already underdeveloped Cuban government, then, addressing prostitution is no small feat.¶ Thus, it is no surprise that the international community, especially organizations which protect women’s rights, have been intrigued by the social development of Cuba. On March 6, 1980, Cuba was the first country to sign the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Like other parties to the convention, Cuba has been legally bound to put its provisions into practice and to submit reports on the progress and overall situation of women within the country, at least every four years. Since the early 2000s, the UN body has addressed the problem of prostitution in Cuba and promoted the abolishment of prostitution through more direct means than those currently present. Prostitution has been a part of the Cuban political agenda for a long time, but in evaluating the problems of prostitution today, it is clear that the Cuban government has done little more than create new policies without enforcing them.¶ Upon receiving and reviewing the 2013 Cuban report on July 9th, CEDAW expressed a number of concerns regarding Cuba’s procedures, objectives, and lack of information on numbers and conditions. The only statistical figure expressed by the deputy head of Cuba’s supreme court, Olga Lidia Jones Morrison, at the July 9th CEDAW conference, was that 660 women over the age of 18 were imprisoned for working as sex workers in 2011. Due to the disconcerting shortage of statistics on sex workers and the reluctance of the government to acknowledge the pressing issue, the CEDAW committee proposed reforms for “guaranteed access to justice, free legal assistance programmes, protection for victims of violence, and mandatory training for judges, prosecutors, police, healthcare and education professionals and journalists on matters of violence against women” since the government has made it clear that it has a zero-tolerance policy on prostitution. The committee gave two years for Cuba to inform them on the policies and steps taken towards the implementation of their recommendations. The next report and examination will still be held in 2017.¶ Castro’s model primarily denounced the exploitation of humans in the capitalist world; yet the **exploitation of women has been prominen**t in his own country. **The Cuban government** **promoted** and facilitated **tourism, and enticed the international population** through the linking of the country **with the image of a sensual** and immoral **Afrocuban woman**. So while policies are put forth to eradicate the issue, contradictory realities encourage and facilitate the growth of this sector. Only recently has the government tried to eradicate prostitution, after many years of denying that it is even a problem. The rapid growth of prostitution and the sex tourism industry has become indicative of a larger social problem; one which represents the crumbling values and institutions of socialism, as economic disparities rise alongside racial inequalities. In the case of prostitution, the social reality has exposed the flaws of the once idealized communist model. It is also important to note that prostitution in a corrupt and poor country only decreases its chance of further development. As a black market develops, it impedes the growth of society as a whole; it brings no addition to GDP, it will decrease the likelihood of social services for the women. With a crumbling social system, Cuba must address the issue of prostitution as fast as possible in order to develop into a more prosperous and more egalitarian country.

Sex tourism violates the rights of women, while enhancing males’ sense of masculine dominance and superiority

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The review of literature suggests that men travel to Thailand as sex tourists to rediscover (create or recreate, construct or reconstruct) their [End Page 89] masculinity (Johnson 2007, p. 154). This rediscovery is based on imagined ideas of the authentic (Johnson 2007, p. 158) and creates constructs which inherently violate the human rights of women through sexual exploitation (Hemingway 2004, pp. 278–79). Two concepts which may influence sex tourists' imagined authenticities of masculinity and femininity are double binds and hegemonic masculinity. Men's failure to achieve "perfect" masculinity (Boon, p. 301) and/or to find "perfect" femininity at home — the perfect being impossible to find — may provide incentives for men to engage in sex tourism away from home. However, this study is not concerned, per se, with the psychology of these motivations or with the critical sociological implications of the persistence of these two underlying cultural constructs. Rather, this study seeks to understand if images of Thai culture and Thailand are constructed and communicated in a way that draws upon such motivations as a means of persuasion that serves to symbolically construct Thailand as an appropriate and desirable "sex tourist" destination. In particular, the explosion of Internet usage among "sex tourist" populations (as well as a means of marketing Thailand as a tourist destination) provides a logical starting place to investigate how such expectations are shaped or targeted in promotional efforts to entice tourists to Thailand. Thus, one move towards responsible tourism requires a critical look at the concepts of double binds and masculine hegemony through a feminist lens as they relate to sex tourism. With this agenda in mind, the following two research questions are posed: 1. What gender roles are communicated as appropriate by websites used to advertise nightlife in Phuket, Thailand? 2. In what ways do the websites used to advertise nightlife in Phuket utilize rhetoric to support or challenge patriarchy?

This is made worse by the commodification of bodies intrinsic to sex tourism

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Mimi’s big sale is in tandem with what sociologist Carolle Charles observes in relation to many working-class and poor Haitian women’s perceptions of the body as a marketable entity: In Haiti, poor and working women speak in a different way about the image and usage of the body for social reproduction, for economic survival, for social status, and for heterosexual encounters and conjugal relationships. [ . . . ] While the dominant discourse symbolically describes women and their bodies as “ripe fruit ready to be eaten,” working class women, in contrast, define their bodies as a “resource, an asset, a form of capital that can reap profits if well invested.” “Kom se kawo tèm” (my body is my piece of land) claim many poor Haitian women.6 Unlike larger Haitian discourse’s patriarchal constructions of women’s bodies, which place the benefits of women’s sexuality at the hands of men, poor and working-class Haitian women’s definitions allow for female agency and capitalizing off of their own bodies. Nevertheless, their use of their bodies as potential capital is not without sexual exploitation by men. Furthermore, in Peggy’s case, Mimi decides to exploit her body as well as her complexion and hair texture, both inherited by a distant ancestor and very much unlike the rest of her family, which render her more of a marketable asset for Henri. In the sale of her own body, Peggy is denied autonomy. Because Mimi is able to sell her daughter, she excitedly informs her children that “Peggy went out to buy water and instead brought you all something even better” (31). Her comment, resonant of the nursery rhyme’s “little piggy” going to the marketplace and returning with provisions, illuminates the body’s potential for capital in the market on macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. Yet, Mimi’s lessened excitement upon looking at Peggy exemplifies, as the narration implies, her guilt over sanctioning her daughter’s sexual exploitation. It possibly also suggests that Mimi may have certain mores concerning “proper” female sexual conduct, but does not have the economic luxury to enforce certain practices. Thus, she perceives selling Peggy’s sexuality as the only feasible way out of extreme poverty. Mimi’s selling of Peggy is tantamount to Peggy’s commercial sexual exploitation, which the World Congress defines as “sexual abuse by the adult and remuneration in cash or kind to the child or to a third person or persons [ . . . ]. [I]t constitutes a form of coercion and violence against children and amounts to forced labor and a contemporary form of slavery.”7 Like slaves, Peggy is sold into servitude without her permission or consent. Her purchase requires her moving to facilities arranged by Henri, where she will, as Mimi informs her, bear his children. Peggy’s situation parallels slaves’ forced sexual labor, including having to bear children, with slave owners and/or other slaves against their will. Additionally, Peggy is to remain deferential to Henri and confined to the bungalow, not traveling even to visit her family. Being excluded from the decision-making process of her purchase and future sexual activities with Henri further emblematizes Peggy’s relatively young, not fully sexually autonomous position and manipulation by both Henri and Mimi. Though not explicitly sexually abusing Peggy, Mimi exploits her daughter’s sexuality for economic gain, thereby [End Page 1108] rendering herself a sexually abusive party. Mimi also takes advantage of Peggy’s complexion, which attracts Henri and leads to his wanting children with her: illustrated by her informing Peggy, “You can make beautiful children for any man. You are lucky that way” (31). Now bought, Peggy is Henri’s “property” and lacks sexual and overall autonomy.

The embargo disproportionately affects Afro-Cuban women – they must resort to working as sexual jockeys to make ends meet

Harrison, 10 – [Faye V. has a PhD in Cultural Anthropology and is a Professor at the University of Florida “Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society, Global Apartheid, Foreign Policy, and Human Rights” 11/30/10 //NG]

Although structural adjustment is a specific policy of the IMF working in conjunction with the World Bank, USAID, and other institutions, the term also refers to a general¶ development orientation and policy climate driven by neoliberal assumptions about eco- nomic growth and change. In other words, structural adjustment can also serve as metonym for the restructuring and realignments that define present-day globalization.43 Hence, in the case of Cuba, although the IMF, World Bank, WTO, and USAID do not Although structural adjustment is a specific policy of the IMF working in conjunction with the World Bank, USAID, and other institutions, the term also refers to a general¶ development orientation and policy climate driven by neoliberal assumptions about eco- nomic growth and change. In other words, structural adjustment can also serve as metonym for the restructuring and realignments that define present-day globalization.43 Hence, in the case of Cuba, although the IMF, World Bank, WTO, and USAID do not¶ directly intervene in the Cuban economy, neoliberal policies—the most coercive and punitive being **the U.S. embargo**—have indeed **reshaped the nation** during its so-called Special Period since the end of USSR and Eastern bloc economic support, and they have undermined its revolutionary achievements in ensuring rights to employment, educa- tion, and health services. This has occurred even though, when the embargo began in the early 1960s, the politico-economic climate in the U.S. and the world was Keynesian rather than neoliberal. Nonetheless, for the past two decades, this punitive policy has been enforced within a politico-economic matrix of neoliberal globalization.¶ In the wake of the disintegration of the USSR and the demise of the Eastern Bloc, **the Cuban government undertook** an “**internal readjustment**” and “rationalization,” **to sus- tain its economy and meet basic subsistence needs.** These changes allowed for greater economic diversification, a partial process of privatization, foreign investment, and “dollarization.”44 The effects of these drastic changes—Cuba’s own structural adjust- ment—on everyday life have been considerable. Cuba’s status as a socialist sanctuary is being destabilized under dollarization and the conditions of economic austerity that led to it. Social inequalities are re-emerging and becoming conspicuous, and crime is becoming a problem. A red flag signaling the chang- ing times can perhaps be found in a troubling December 2001 incident in which five members of a family, including an eight-year-old child and a couple visiting from Florida, were murdered in a robbery in Matanzas Province. This heinous incident was unusual in that murders are extremely rare in Cuba and mass murders “are unheard of.”45 **The eco- nomic crisis** that has **brought** about this unprecedented crime wave has caused **escalating unemployment** and has reduced safety net provisions—trends that have **impacted** Afri- can-descended Cubans, and **Afro-Cuban women** in particular, **more than any other** seg- ment **of the population**. **With less access to** kin-mediated **remittances** from the dispro- portionately white emigré communities overseas**, there is more pressure on Afro-Cuban women,** who are more likely than white Cubans to live in female-headed households, **to** stand in long lines for rations, stretch the devalued peso, and **make ends meet by any means necessary**.**46 Any means necessary** has come to **include** doing own-account work— trabajo por cuenta propia—in the underground economy aligned with the growing tour- ist sector. For younger women, particularly those who fit the culturally constructed ste- reotype of la mulata, this is increasingly being translated into **working as** jineteras (**sexual jockeys**). **This line of work reflects Cuba’s historical race, gender, and class bound- aries.4**7 Desperate to lure foreigners to the country’s beaches and hotel resorts, the Cuban government itself has resorted to manipulating pre-revolutionary racial clichés by “show- casing ‘traditional’ Afro-Cuban religious rituals and art, ‘traditional’ Afro-Cuban mu- sic, and Afro-Cuban women,” who are foregrounded as performers in these commodified contexts.”48¶ The sexual exoticization of African-descended women has a long history in Cuba as well as throughout the African diaspora and the West, where variations on the theme of Black hypersexuality are rampant as either a positively valued essentialism or a fertility- or health- related social problem. Nadine Fernandez questions the assumption that Black and mulatto women predominate in Cuba’s sex tourism by highlighting the role of a racially biased gaze in attributing Afro-Cuban women’s interactions with male tourists to prostitution while perceiving white women’s interactions in terms of alternative inter- pretations, including that of “romance.” Because of their greater access to dollars and to jobs in the tourist sector, white women are more likely to have privileged access to tourists in restricted venues (shops, restaurants, and nightclubs) where Afro-Cubans are ot generally permitted to enter. Consequently, Afro-Cubans interact with tourists “out- side tourist installations, making their meetings much more visible and scrutinized by the public eye.”49 In the context of Cuba’s current crisis, **traditional racial narratives of gender, race, and sexuality are being reasserted and rewritten to fit with recent restruc- turing**.50¶ **The U.S. embargo** **is** a flagrant form of foreign intervention. Like official structural adjustment policies, it has been **premised on an ideology of power, recolonization**, and ranked capitals **that assumes that Cubans** are expendable troublemakers—perhaps even harborers of terrorism—who **deserve to be starved out of their** defiant **opposition to U.S. dominance. The same ideology that rationalizes** the unregulated spread of **commodification** into all spheres of social life implies **that** Cuban women’s bodies, es- pecially A**fro-Cubanas ’ hypersexualized bodies, can be bought and sold** on the auction block of imposed economic austerity without any accountability on the part of the papiriquis, or sugardaddies, of global capital. The implication of these policies is that Afro-Cuban families and communities can be sacrificed so that northerners can enjoy privileges—including that of living in a “good” and “free” society—that southern work- ers and peasants subsidize. Cuba’s current crisis is being negotiated over the bodies of its women, with African-descended women, las negras y mulatas, las chicas calientes (Black and mulatto women, hot sexy chicks), expected to bear the worst assaults against what remains in many ways a defiant socialist sanctuary.51

## 1AC Relations

US-Cuban oil coop key to check existing US-Latin American tensions.

Benjamin-Alvarado ‘10

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication – obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 3-4

The development of Cuba as an energy partner will not solve America’s energy problems. But the potential for improving energy relations and deepening collaborative modalities with other regional partners is enhanced by pursuing energy cooperation with Cuba for two principal reasons. 1. Cuba’s increasing leadership role in the Caribbean region and Central America might be used by the United States to promote collectively beneficial efforts to develop a broad range of alternative energy technologies in the Americas. A Cuba-America partnership might also serve as a confidence builder in assuaging the misgivings on the part of regional partners regarding American domination. 2. Cuba’s significant human capital resources in the scientific and technological arena have been grossly underused. Cuba possesses the highest ratio of engineers and Ph.D.s to the general population of any country in Latin America, and this can been viewed as a key asset in the challenge of maintaining energy infrastructure across the region. Both Mexico and Venezuela face significant costs in maintaining their sizable energy production, refining, and storage capabilities. The integrity of these two national energy systems is of paramount interest to U.S. energy security concerns because of the potential harm to the economy that would occur if either state were unable to deliver its exports to the American market.¶ In this light, the impetus for normalization of relations writ large between the United States and Cuba is not oil per se, but enhanced energy cooperation, which could pave the way for technical and commercial exchanges that, given the evolving nature of energy resources and energy security, could provide an opening of collaborative efforts that could have mutually beneficial effects. What has the failure to engage Cuba cost the United States in these geostrategic terms? Very little, one could argue. Strategically, Cuba has been a stable entity in the region. Politically, too, it has been a mostly static environment: with the embargo in place, policymakers and elected officials have been able to predict reactions to policy initiatives with relative certainty. U.S. business interests in Cuba since the early 1960s have been negligible, with the exception of a recent increase in humanitarian agricultural and medical sales. But a more central issue is this: In light of growing concerns regarding energy supplies in the United States and demands for domestic and regional exploration to meet American consumption, what is the cost to the United States of maintaining a status quo relationship with Cuba? In economic terms, the cost of the failure to engage Cuba has been considerable. In its 2008 report, Rethinking U.S.-Latin American Relations, the Partnership for the Americas Commission, convened by the Brookings Institution, suggested that the basis for effective partnership between the United States and its Latin American and Caribbean partners is shared common interests. The report states, “Cuba has long been a subject of intense interest in U.S. foreign policy and a stumbling block for U.S. relations with other countries in the hemisphere.” 6 Specifically, the report pinpoints two key challenges facing the region that are directly relevant to the subject of this book: securing sustainable energy supplies and expanding economic development opportunities. The April 2009 report of the Brookings project on U.S. Policy Toward a Cuba in Transition identified both medium and long-term initiatives related to energy that directly fulfilled an element of the policy objectives recommended in their report. 7 In order to specifically promote what the report termed “a constructive working relationship with the Cuban government to build confidence and trust in order to resolve disputes, with the long term objective of fostering a better relationship that serves U.S. interests and values,” it recommended a medium-term initiative that “allows licenses for U.S. companies to participate in the development of Cuban offshore oil, gas, and renewable energy resources.” The report also recommended that a long term initiative be undertaken to “provide general licenses for the exportation of additional categories of goods and services that enhance the environment, conserve energy, and provide improved quality of life.”

Now a key time for US-Latin American ties. Permanent collapse coming.

Shifter ‘12

(Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)

If the United States and Latin America do not make the effort now, the chance may slip away. The most likely scenario then would be marked by a continued drift in their relationship, further deterioration of hemisphere-wide institutions, a reduced ability and willingness to deal with a range of common problems, and a spate of missed opportunities for more robust growth and greater social equity. The United States and Latin America would go their separate ways, manage their affairs independently of one another, and forego the opportunities that could be harvested by a more productive relationship. There are risks of simply maintaining the status quo. Urgent problems will inevitably arise that require trust and effective collaboration to resolve. And there is a chance that tensions between the United States and Latin America could become much worse, adversely affecting everyone’s interests and wellbeing. It is time to seize the moment and overhaul hemispheric relations.

Cuba is key to US-Latin American Relations-specifically spills-over to global coop on warming- overcomes alt causes

Shifter ‘12

(Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)

Cuba, too, poses a significant challenge for relations between the United States and Latin America. The 50-year-old US embargo against Cuba is rightly criticized throughout the hemisphere as a failed and punitive instrument. It has long been a strain on US-Latin American relations. Although the United States has recently moved in the right direction and taken steps to relax restrictions on travel to Cuba, Washington needs to do far more to dismantle its severe, outdated constraints on normalized relations with Cuba. Cuba is one of the residual issues that most obstructs more effective US-Latin American engagement. At the same time, Cuba’s authoritarian regime should be of utmost concern to all countries in the Americas. At present, it is the only country without free, multi-party elections, and its government fully controls the press. Latin American and Caribbean nations could be instrumental in supporting Cuba’s eventual transition to democratic rule. An end to the US policy of isolating Cuba, without setting aside US concern about human rights violations, would be an important first step. Many of the issues on the hemispheric agenda carry critical global dimensions. Because of this, the United States should seek greater cooperation and consultation with Brazil, Mexico, and other countries of the region in world forums addressing shared interests. Brazil has the broadest international presence and influence of any Latin American nation. In recent years it has become far more active on global issues of concern to the United States. The United States and Brazil have clashed over such issues as Iran’s nuclear program, non-proliferation, and the Middle East uprisings, but they have cooperated when their interests converged, such as in the World Trade Organization and the G-20 (Mexico, Argentina, and Canada also participate in the G-20), and in efforts to rebuild and provide security for Haiti. Washington has worked with Brazil and other Latin American countries to raise the profile of emerging economies in various international financial agencies, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In addition to economic and financial matters, Brazil and other Latin American nations are assuming enhanced roles on an array of global political, environmental, and security issues. Several for which US and Latin American cooperation could become increasingly important include: As the world’s lone nuclear-weapons-free region, Latin America has the opportunity to participate more actively in non-proliferation efforts. Although US and Latin American interests do not always converge on non-proliferation questions, they align on some related goals. For example, the main proliferation challenges today are found in developing and unstable parts of the world, as well as in the leakage—or transfer of nuclear materials—to terrorists. In that context, south-south connections are crucial. Brazil could play a pivotal role. Many countries in the region give priority to climate change challenges. This may position them as a voice in international debates on this topic. The importance of the Amazon basin to worldwide climate concerns gives Brazil and five other South American nations a special role to play. Mexico already has assumed a prominent position on climate change and is active in global policy debates. Brazil organized the first-ever global environmental meeting in 1992 and, this year, will host Rio+20. Mexico hosted the second international meeting on climate change in Cancún in 2010. The United States is handicapped by its inability to devise a climate change policy. Still, it should support coordination on the presumptionof shared interests on a critical policy challenge. Latin Americans are taking more active leadership on drug policy in the hemisphere and could become increasingly influential in global discussions of drug strategies. Although the United States and Latin America are often at odds on drug policy, they have mutual interests and goals that should allow consultation and collaboration on a new, more effective approach to the problem.

Improving the effectiveness of global coop key to solve warming

Slaughter ‘11

(Anne-Marie, Bert G. Kerstetter '66 university professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, “Problems Will Be Global -- And Solutions Will Be, Too”, Foreign Policy, Sept/Oct, Issue 188, Ebsco)

A more multilateral world is just the beginning Before considering the world in 2025,14 years from now, it is worth remembering the world 14 years ago, in 1997. Back then, the United States was the sole superpower, its immensity and dominance of the international system so evident as to trigger the resentful label of "hyperpower" from the French foreign minister. The American economy was expanding fast enough to leave the country a healthy and growing surplus by the end of Bill Clinton's presidency three years later. The European Union, then still only four years old, had just 15 members; the euro did not exist. The wars dominating the headlines were in Europe: Bosnia, Croatia, and, soon, Kosovo. The term BRICs -- the Goldman Sachs label attached to the fast-growing emerging markets of Brazil, Russia, India, and China -- had not yet been invented. The Internet was booming, but social media did not exist. You get the point: A lot can change in 14 years, and rarely in ways foreseen. In the spirit of proper humility, then, here's my take on what the landscape of global diplomacy will look like a decade and a half from now: For starters, the world will be much more multilateral. By 2025 the U.N. Security Council will have expanded from the present 15 members to between 25 and 30 and will include, either as de jure or de facto permanent members, Brazil, India, Japan, South Africa, either Egypt or Nigeria, and either Indonesia or Turkey. At the same time, regional organizations on every continent -- the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, some version of the Organization of American States -- will be much stronger. Each will follow its own version of economic and political integration, inspired by the European Union, and many will include representation from smaller subregional organizations. In the Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey could provide the core of a new Middle East free trade area; alternatively the European Union could be interlocked with an emerging Mediterranean Union. Driving this massive multilateralization is the increasingly global and regional nature of our problems, combined with an expanding number of countries splitting off from existing states. National governments will remain essential for many purposes, but managing bilateral relations and engaging in successful global negotiations with nearly 200 states will become increasingly unwieldy. So we'll negotiate territorial disputes in the South China Sea in a regional framework and deal with crises in Ivory Coast or Guinea through the African Union or even smaller subregional forums. At the global level, the speed and flexibility necessary to resolve crises require smaller groups like the G-20, while long-term legitimacy and durability still require the representation of all countries affected by a particular issue through large standing organizations. As for individual countries, the states that will be the strongest in 2025 will be those that have figured out how to do more with less. They will be those governments that have successfully embraced radical sustainability -- maintaining vibrant economies through largely renewable energy and creative reuse of just about everything. The leader will be Japan, a great civilization that has for centuries pioneered spectacularly beautiful ways of appreciating and coexisting with nature. As China's youth seek more of everything, Japan's are prepared to embrace a far more sustainable path. Scandinavia, Germany, New Zealand, and possibly South Korea will also be strong; many emerging or even less developed economies have real potential, if they can tap into their indigenous habits of conservation. Embracing sustainable growth will challenge the United States; its national renewal will depend on connecting its traditions of innovation, decentralization, and liberty with a narrative of protecting America's natural bounty. Think America the Beautiful more than the Star-Spangled Banner. But the most dramatic changes between 2011 and 2025 won't take place at the level of statecraft and grand strategy; they are likely to happen as new technologies continue to transform businesses, civic organizations of all kinds, universities, foundations, and churches -- now able to self-organize as never before around issues they care about. The American social revolution that Alexis de Tocqueville observed in the early 19th century, of citizens joining groups of every conceivable kind, is about to go global, forever changing the relationship between citizens and their governments, and governments with each other. The Arab revolutions are but the first taste of this larger change. These predictions may appear rosy. In fact, the enormous changes on the horizon will require major crises, even cataclysm, before they can materialize. It took World War I to generate the political will and circumstances necessary to create the League of Nations; it took World War II to create the United Nations; it took the worst economic crisis since the 1930s to force the expansion of the G-8 into the G-20. Just imagine what it will take to break the decades-old logjam of Security Council reform. And creating and changing multilateral organizations is child's play next to the profound changes in public and private behavior required to move away from the more-is-better economic model to one which accepts that our resources are finite on a planetary scale. Yet the sources of potential crises and disasters of a magnitude sufficient to force systemic change are all around us: Climate change is driving countries closer to the extremes of desert and jungle, droughts and floods, while a global pandemic or a nuclear terrorist attack would have a similar impact. This is not Malthusian gloom, however. As Robert Wright argues in Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny, catastrophe is terrible for individual human beings but beneficial for humanity as a whole. As the full consequences of genuinely global interconnectedness continue to make themselves felt, the world of both states and the societies they represent will have no choice but to adapt.

Global warming is anthropogenic and will cause extinction

James Hansen, PHD, director of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, May 9, 2012, “Game Over for the Climate”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/opinion/game-over-for-the-climate.html?_r=1&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss>,

GLOBAL warming isn’t a prediction. It is happening. That is why I was so troubled to read a recent interview with President Obama in Rolling Stone in which he said that Canada would exploit the oil in its vast tar sands reserves “regardless of what we do.” If Canada proceeds, and we do nothing, it will be game over for the climate. Canada’s tar sands, deposits of sand saturated with bitumen, contain twice the amount of carbon dioxide emitted by global oil use in our entire history. If we were to fully exploit this new oil source, and continue to burn our conventional oil, gas and coal supplies, concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere eventually would reach levels higher than in the Pliocene era, more than 2.5 million years ago, when sea level was at least 50 feet higher than it is now. That level of heat-trapping gases would assure that the disintegration of the ice sheets would accelerate out of control. Sea levels would rise and destroy coastal cities. Global temperatures would become intolerable. Twenty to 50 percent of the planet’s species would be driven to extinction. Civilization would be at risk. That is the long-term outlook. But near-term, things will be bad enough. Over the next several decades, the Western United States and the semi-arid region from North Dakota to Texas will develop semi-permanent drought, with rain, when it does come, occurring in extreme events with heavy flooding. Economic losses would be incalculable. More and more of the Midwest would be a dust bowl. California’s Central Valley could no longer be irrigated. Food prices would rise to unprecedented levels. If this sounds apocalyptic, it is. This is why we need to reduce emissions dramatically. President Obama has the power not only to deny tar sands oil additional access to Gulf Coast refining, which Canada desires in part for export markets, but also to encourage economic incentives to leave tar sands and other dirty fuels in the ground. The global warming signal is now louder than the noise of random weather, as I predicted would happen by now in the journal Science in 1981. Extremely hot summers have increased noticeably. We can say with high confidence that the recent heat waves in Texas and Russia, and the one in Europe in 2003, which killed tens of thousands, were not natural events — they were caused by human-induced climate change. We have known since the 1800s that carbon dioxide traps heat in the atmosphere. The right amount keeps the climate conducive to human life. But add too much, as we are doing now, and temperatures will inevitably rise too high. This is not the result of natural variability, as some argue. The earth is currently in the part of its long-term orbit cycle where temperatures would normally be cooling. But they are rising — and it’s because we are forcing them higher with fossil fuel emissions. The concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has risen from 280 parts per million to 393 p.p.m. over the last 150 years. The tar sands contain enough carbon — 240 gigatons — to add 120 p.p.m. Tar shale, a close cousin of tar sands found mainly in the United States, contains at least an additional 300 gigatons of carbon. If we turn to these dirtiest of fuels, instead of finding ways to phase out our addiction to fossil fuels, there is no hope of keeping carbon concentrations below 500 p.p.m. — a level that would, as earth’s history shows, leave our children a climate system that is out of their control. We need to start reducing emissions significantly, not create new ways to increase them. We should impose a gradually rising carbon fee, collected from fossil fuel companies, then distribute 100 percent of the collections to all Americans on a per-capita basis every month. The government would not get a penny. This market-based approach would stimulate innovation, jobs and economic growth, avoid enlarging government or having it pick winners or losers. Most Americans, except the heaviest energy users, would get more back than they paid in increased prices. Not only that, the reduction in oil use resulting from the carbon price would be nearly six times as great as the oil supply from the proposed pipeline from Canada, rendering the pipeline superfluous, according to economic models driven by a slowly rising carbon price. But instead of placing a rising fee on carbon emissions to make fossil fuels pay their true costs, leveling the energy playing field, the world’s governments are forcing the public to subsidize fossil fuels with hundreds of billions of dollars per year. This encourages a frantic stampede to extract every fossil fuel through mountaintop removal, longwall mining, hydraulic fracturing, tar sands and tar shale extraction, and deep ocean and Arctic drilling. President Obama speaks of a “planet in peril,” but he does not provide the leadership needed to change the world’s course. Our leaders must speak candidly to the public — which yearns for open, honest discussion — explaining that our continued technological leadership and economic well-being demand a reasoned change of our energy course. History has shown that the American public can rise to the challenge, but leadership is essential. The science of the situation is clear — it’s time for the politics to follow. This is a plan that can unify conservatives and liberals, environmentalists and business. Every major national science academy in the world has reported that global warming is real, caused mostly by humans, and requires urgent action. The cost of acting goes far higher the longer we wait — we can’t wait any longer to avoid the worst and be judged immoral by coming generations.

Allowing warming to continue perpetuates inequalities – it disproportionately affects women and low income communities

Julia Whittney, 3/8/07, (“Climate Change Will Affect Women More Severely Than Men”, <http://www.motherjones.com/blue-marble/2007/03/climate-change-will-affect-women-more-severely-men>, AW)

Today is International Women's Day. You'd hardly know it. Though the IUCN (World Conservation Union) has celebrated by releasing a disturbing report on global warming predicting that the physical, economic, social, and cultural impacts of global warming will jeopardize women far more then men. Just as Hurricane Katrina and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami disproportionately affected women far more then men. The report, Gender and Climate Change (available here as a PDF), concludes that women are more severely affected by climate change and natural disasters because of their social roles and because of discrimination and poverty. To make matters worse, they're also underrepresented in decision-making about climate change, greenhouse gas emissions, and, most critically, discussions and decisions about adaptation and mitigation. From the report: For example, the 20,000 people who died in France during the extreme heat wave in Europe in 2003 included significantly more elderly women than men. In natural disasters that have occurred in recent years, both in developing and in developed countries, it is primarily the poor who have suffered—and all over the world, the majority of the poor are women, who at all levels earn less than men. In developing countries, women living in poverty bear a disproportionate burden of climate change consequences. Because of women's marginalized status and dependence on local natural resources, their domestic burdens are increased, including additional work to fetch water, or to collect fuel and fodder. In some areas, climate change generates resource shortages and unreliable job markets, which lead to increased male-out migration and more women left behind with additional agricultural and households duties. Poor women's lack of access to and control over natural resources, technologies and credit mean that they have fewer resources to cope with seasonal and episodic weather and natural disasters. Consequently traditional roles are reinforced, girls' education suffers, and women's ability to diversify their livelihoods (and therefore their capacity to access income-generating jobs) is diminished. The report notes examples from other sources, including this: An Oxfam Report (March 2005) on the impact of the 2004 Asia Tsunami on women raised alarms about gender imbalances since the majority of those killed and among those least able to recover were women. In Aceh, for example, more than 75 percent of those who died were women, resulting in a male-female ratio of 3:1 among the survivors. As so many mothers died, there have been major consequences with respect to infant mortality, early marriage of girls, neglect of girls' education, sexual assault, trafficking in women and prostitution. These woes, however, are largely neglected in the media coverage. And this: In a study executed on behalf of ACTIONAID in 1993-1994 in the Himalayan region of Nepal, it became clear that environmental degradation has compounded stress within households and pressure on scarce resources. This meant that the pressure on children, particularly girl children, to do more work and at an earlier age was increasing. Girls do the hardiest work, have the least say and the fewest education options. Programmes that concentrate only on sending more girls to school were failing as the environmental and social conditions of the families deteriorated. Ironically, women also produce less greenhouse gas emissions than men, the report concludes. Flatulence jokes aside, this includes women in the developed world. In Europe, in both the work and leisure contexts, women travel by car less frequently and over shorter distances, use smaller, energy-saving cars and fly considerably less frequently than men. Women are over represented as heads of low-income households and under represented in high-income groups. In this respect, income levels play a role in CO2 emissions: the higher the income, the higher the emissions from larger houses with more electrical equipment, bigger cars and so on. Lower income people, who happen to be—you guessed it—mostly women, also have less access to energy-efficient appliances and homes because these tend to be more costly. Most frustrating of all, women perceive global warming as a more dangerous threat than men do and would do more to address it, given the tools. Women and men perceive the cause of climate change (including CO2 emissions) differently. In Germany, more than 50 percent of women compared to only 40 percent of men, rate climate change brought about by global warming as extremely or very dangerous. Women also believed very firmly that each individual can contribute toward protecting the climate through his/her individual actions. However, policy planning does not reflect in anyway these perceptions. By excluding women, the world loses vital input and profound knowledge—knowledge that may prove key to adapting to climate change. Inuit women in Northern Canada have always had a deep understanding of weather conditions, as they were responsible for assessing hunting conditions and preparing the hunters accordingly. During a drought in the small islands of the Federal States of Micronesia, it was local women, knowledgeable about island hydrology as a result of land-based work, who were able to find potable water by digging a new well that reached the freshwater lens. The report concludes: There is a need to refocus the thinking and the debate on energy and climate change to include a human rights perspective. Integrating a rights-based approach to access to sustainable and affordable energy is an approach that will recognise and take into account women's specific needs and women's human rights. Current economic models based primarily on privatisation strategies do not include accountability in terms of meeting people's basic needs. The UN has established a website on gender and climate change, where you can learn more, get involved.

## 1AC Solvency

Deliberation through policy debate is key to solving climate change through citizen involvement and subsumes their critiques of traditional forms of decision-making

Isham 10 (Jon, Associate Professor of Economics, Middlebury College, “The Promise of Deliberative Democracy”, Volume 1 | Issue 5 | Page 25-27 | Oct 2010, <http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/775>)

BLUE

Getting to 350 parts per million CO2 in the atmosphere will require massive investments in clean-energy infrastructure—investments that can too often be foiled by a combination of special interests and political sclerosis. Take the recent approval of the Cape Wind project by the U.S. Department of the Interior. In some ways, this was great news for clean-energy advocates: the project’s 130 turbines will produce, on average, 170 megawatts of electricity, almost 75 percent of the average electricity demand for Cape Cod and the islands of Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket.1 But, because of local opposition by well-organized opponents, the approval process was lengthy, costly, and grueling —and all for a project that will produce only 0.04 percent of the total (forecasted) U.S. electricity demand in 2010.2,3 Over the next few decades, the world will need thousands of large-scale, low-carbon electricity projects—wind, solar, and nuclear power will certainly be in the mix. But if each faces Cape Wind–like opposition, getting to 350 is unlikely. How can the decision-making process about such projects be streamlined so that public policy reflects the view of a well-informed majority, provides opportunities for legitimate critiques, but does not permit the opposition to retard the process indefinitely? One answer is found in a set of innovative policy-making tools founded on the principle of deliberative democracy, defined as “decision making by discussion among free and equal citizens.”4 Such approaches, which have been developed and led by the Center for Deliberative Democracy (cdd.stanford.edu), America Speaks (www.americaspeaks.org), and the Consensus Building Institute (cbuilding.org), among others, are gaining popularity by promising a new foothold for effective citizen participation in the drive for a clean-energy future. Deliberative democracy stems from the belief that democratic leadership should involve educating constituents about issues at hand, and that citizens may significantly alter their opinions when faced with information about these issues. Advocates of the approach state that democracy should shift away from fixed notions toward a learning process in which people develop defensible positions.5 While the approaches of the Center for Deliberative Democracy, America Speaks, and the Consensus Building Institute do differ, all of these deliberative methodologies involve unbiased sharing of information and public-policy alternatives with a representative set of citizens; a moderated process of deliberation among the selected citizens; and the collection and dissemination of data resulting from this process. For example, in the deliberative polling approach used by the Center for Deliberative Democracy, a random selection of citizens is first polled on a particular issue. Then, members of the poll are invited to gather at a single place to discuss the issue. Participants receive balanced briefing materials to review before the gathering, and at the gathering they engage in dialogue with competing experts and political leaders based on questions they develop in small group discussions. After deliberations, the sample is asked the original poll questions, and the resulting changes in opinion represent the conclusions that the public would reach if everyone were given the opportunity to become more informed on pressing issues.6 If policymakers look at deliberative polls rather than traditional polls, they will be able to utilize results that originate from an informed group of citizens. As with traditional polls, deliberative polls choose people at random to represent U.S. demographics of age, education, gender, and so on. But traditional polls stop there, asking the random sample some brief, simple questions, typically online or over the phone. However, participants of deliberative polls have the opportunity to access expert information and then talk with one another before voting on policy recommendations. The power of this approach is illustrated by the results of a global deliberative process organized by World Wide Views on Global Warming (www.wwviews.org), a citizen’s deliberation organization based in Denmark.7 On September 26, 2009, approximately 4,000 people gathered in 38 countries to consider what should happen at the UN climate change negotiations in Copenhagen (338 Americans met in five major cities). The results derived from this day of deliberation were dramatic and significantly different from results of traditional polls. Overall, citizens showed strong concern about global warming and support for climate-change legislation, contrary to the outcomes of many standard climate-change polls. Based on the polling results from these gatherings, 90 percent of global citizens believe that it is urgent for the UN negotiations to produce a new climate change agreement; 88 percent of global citizens (82 percent of U.S. citizens) favor holding global warming to within 2 degrees Celsius of pre-industrial levels; and 74 percent of global citizens (69 percent of U.S. citizens) favor increasing fossil-fuel prices in developed countries. However, a typical news poll that was conducted two days before 350.org’s International Day of Climate Action on October 24, 2009, found that Americans had an overall declining concern about global warming.7 How can deliberative democracy help to create solutions for the climate-change policy process, to accelerate the kinds of policies and public investments that are so crucial to getting the world on a path to 350? Take again the example of wind in the United States. In the mid-1990s, the Texas Public Utilities Commission (PUC) launched an “integrated resource plan” to develop long-term strategies for energy production, particularly electricity.8 Upon learning about the deliberative polling approach of James Fishkin (then at the University of Texas at Austin), the PUC set up deliberative sessions for several hundred customers in the vicinity of every major utility provider in the state. The results were a surprise: it turned out that participants ranked reliability and stability of electricity supply as more important characteristics than price. In addition, they were open to supporting renewable energy, even if the costs slightly exceeded fossil-fuel sources. Observers considered this a breakthrough: based on these public deliberations, the PUC went on to champion an aggressive renewable portfolio standard, and the state has subsequently experienced little of the opposition to wind-tower siting that has slowed development in other states.8 By 2009, Texas had 9,500 megawatts of installed wind capacity, as much as the next six states (ranked by wind capacity) in the windy lower and upper Midwest (Iowa, Minnesota, Colorado, North Dakota, Kansas, and New Mexico).9 Deliberative democracy has proven effective in a wide range of countries and settings. In the Chinese township of Zeguo, a series of deliberative polls has helped the Local People’s Congress (LPC) to become a more effective decision-making body.10 In February 2008, 175 citizens were randomly selected to scrutinize the town’s budget—and 60 deputies from the LPC observed the process. After the deliberations, support decreased for budgeting for national defense projects, while support rose for infrastructure (e.g., rural road construction) and environmental protection. Subsequently, the LPC increased support for environmental projects by 9 percent.10 In decades to come, China must be at the forefront of the world’s investments in clean-energy infrastructure. The experience of Zeguo, if scaled up and fully supported by Chinese leaders, can help to play an important role. Deliberative democracy offers one solution for determining citizen opinions, including those on pressing issues related to climate change and clean energy. If democracy is truly about representing popular opinion, policymakers should seek out deliberative polls in their decision-making process.

Public advocacy of climate solutions key to change governmental policy---individual change insufficient

CAG 10—Climate Change Communication Advisory Group. Dr Adam Corner School of Psychology, Cardiff University - Dr Tom Crompton Change Strategist, WWF-UK - Scott Davidson Programme Manager, Global Action Plan - Richard Hawkins Senior Researcher, Public Interest Research Centre - Professor Tim Kasser, Psychology department, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois, USA. - Dr Renee Lertzman, Center for Sustainable Processes & Practices, Portland State University, US. - Peter Lipman, Policy Director, Sustrans. - Dr Irene Lorenzoni, Centre for Environmental Risk, University of East Anglia. - George Marshall, Founding Director, Climate Outreach , Information Network - Dr Ciaran Mundy, Director, Transition Bristol - Dr Saffron O’Neil, Department of Resource Management and Geography, University of Melbourne, Australia. - Professor Nick Pidgeon, Director, Understanding Risk Research Group, School of Psychology, Cardiff University. - Dr Anna Rabinovich, School of Psychology, University of Exeter - Rosemary Randall, Founder and director of Cambridge Carbon Footprint - Dr Lorraine Whitmarsh, School of Psychology, Cardiff University & Visiting Fellow at the, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. (Communicating climate change to mass public audience, http://pirc.info/downloads/communicating\_climate\_mass\_audiences.pdf)

This short advisory paper collates a set of recommendations about how best to shape mass public communications aimed at increasing concern about climate change and motivating commensurate behavioural changes.¶ Its focus is not upon motivating small private-sphere behavioural changes on a piece-meal basis. Rather, it marshals evidence about how best to motivate the ambitious and systemic behavioural change that is necessary – including, crucially, greater public engagement with the policy process (through, for example, lobbying decision-makers and elected representatives, or participating in demonstrations), as well as major lifestyle changes. ¶ Political leaders themselves have drawn attention to the imperative for more vocal public pressure to create the ‘political space’ for them to enact more ambitious policy interventions. 1 While this paper does not dismiss the value of individuals making small private-sphere behavioural changes (for example, adopting simple domestic energy efficiency measures) it is clear that such behaviours do not, in themselves, represent a proportional response to the challenge of climate change. As David MacKay, Chief Scientific Advisor to the UK Department of Energy and Climate change writes: “Don’t be distracted by the myth that ‘every little helps’. If everyone does a little, we’ll achieve only a little” (MacKay, 2008).¶ The task of campaigners and communicators from government, business and non-governmental organisations must therefore be to motivate both (i) widespread adoption of ambitious private-sphere behavioural changes; and (ii) widespread acceptance of – and indeed active demand for – ambitious new policy interventions.¶ Current public communication campaigns, as orchestrated by government, business and non-governmental organisations, are not achieving these changes. This paper asks: how should such communications be designed if they are to have optimal impact in motivating these changes? The response to this question will require fundamental changes in the ways that many climate change communication campaigns are currently devised and implemented. ¶ This advisory paper offers a list of principles that could be used to enhance the quality of communication around climate change communications. The authors are each engaged in continuously sifting the evidence from a range of sub-disciplines within psychology, and reflecting on the implications of this for improving climate change communications. Some of the organisations that we represent have themselves at times adopted approaches which we have both learnt from and critique in this paper – so some of us have first hand experience of the need for on-going improvement in the strategies that we deploy. ¶ The changes we advocate will be challenging to enact – and will require vision and leadership on the part of the organisations adopting them. But without such vision and leadership, we do not believe that public communication campaigns on climate change will create the necessary behavioural changes – indeed, there is a profound risk that many of today’s campaigns will actually prove counter-productive. ¶ Seven Principles¶ 1. Move Beyond Social Marketing¶ We believe that too little attention is paid to the understanding that psychologists bring to strategies for motivating change, whilst undue faith is often placed in the application of marketing strategies to ‘sell’ behavioural changes. Unfortunately, in the context of ambitious pro-environmental behaviour, such strategies seem unlikely to motivate systemic behavioural change.¶ Social marketing is an effective way of achieving a particular behavioural goal – dozens of practical examples in the field of health behaviour attest to this. Social marketing is really more of a framework for designing behaviour change programmes than a behaviour change programme - it offers a method of maximising the success of a specific behavioural goal. Darnton (2008) has described social marketing as ‘explicitly transtheoretical’, while Hastings (2007), in a recent overview of social marketing, claimed that there is no theory of social marketing. Rather, it is a ‘what works’ philosophy, based on previous experience of similar campaigns and programmes. Social marketing is flexible enough to be applied to a range of different social domains, and this is undoubtedly a fundamental part of its appeal.¶ However, social marketing’s 'what works' status also means that it is agnostic about the longer term, theoretical merits of different behaviour change strategies, or the cultural values that specific campaigns serve to strengthen. Social marketing dictates that the most effective strategy should be chosen, where effective means ‘most likely to achieve an immediate behavioural goal’. ¶ This means that elements of a behaviour change strategy designed according to the principles of social marketing may conflict with other, broader goals. What if the most effective way of promoting pro-environmental behaviour ‘A’ was to pursue a strategy that was detrimental to the achievement of long term pro-environmental strategy ‘Z’? The principles of social marketing have no capacity to resolve this conflict – they are limited to maximising the success of the immediate behavioural programme. This is not a flaw of social marketing – it was designed to provide tools to address specific behavioural problems on a piecemeal basis. But it is an important limitation, and one that has significant implications if social marketing techniques are used to promote systemic behavioural change and public engagement on an issue like climate change. ¶ 2. Be honest and forthright about the probable impacts of climate change, and the scale of the challenge we confront in avoiding these. But avoid deliberate attempts to provoke fear or guilt. ¶ There is no merit in ‘dumbing down’ the scientific evidence that the impacts of climate change are likely to be severe, and that some of these impacts are now almost certainly unavoidable. Accepting the impacts of climate change will be an important stage in motivating behavioural responses aimed at mitigating the problem. However, deliberate attempts to instil fear or guilt carry considerable risk. ¶ Studies on fear appeals confirm the potential for fear to change attitudes or verbal expressions of concern, but often not actions or behaviour (Ruiter et al., 2001). The impact of fear appeals is context - and audience - specific; for example, for those who do not yet realise the potentially ‘scary’ aspects of climate change, people need to first experience themselves as vulnerable to the risks in some way in order to feel moved or affected (Das et al, 2003; Hoog et al, 2005). As people move towards contemplating action, fear appeals can help form a behavioural intent, providing an impetus or spark to ‘move’ from; however such appeals must be coupled with constructive information and support to reduce the sense of danger (Moser, 2007). The danger is that fear can also be disempowering – producing feelings of helplessness, remoteness and lack of control (O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Fear is likely to trigger ‘barriers to engagement’, such as denial2 (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Weber, 2006; Moser and Dilling, 2007; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole & Whitmarsh, 2007). The location of fear in a message is also relevant; it works better when placed first for those who are inclined to follow the advice, but better second for those who aren't (Bier, 2001).¶ Similarly, studies have shown that guilt can play a role in motivating people to take action but can also function to stimulate defensive mechanisms against the perceived threat or challenge to one’s sense of identity (as a good, moral person). In the latter case, behaviours may be left untouched (whether driving a SUV or taking a flight) as one defends against any feelings of guilt or complicity through deployment of a range of justifications for the behaviour (Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010). ¶ Overall, there is a need for emotionally balanced representations of the issues at hand. This will involve acknowledging the ‘affective reality’ of the situation, e.g. “We know this is scary and overwhelming, but many of us feel this way and we are doing something about it”.¶ 3. Be honest and forthright about the impacts of mitigating and adapting to climate change for current lifestyles, and the ‘loss’ - as well as the benefits - that these will entail. Narratives that focus exclusively on the ‘up-side’ of climate solutions are likely to be unconvincing. While narratives about the future impacts of climate change may highlight the loss of much that we currently hold to be dear, narratives about climate solutions frequently ignore the question of loss. If the two are not addressed concurrently, fear of loss may be ‘split off’ and projected into the future, where it is all too easily denied. This can be dangerous, because accepting loss is an important step towards working through the associated emotions, and emerging with the energy and creativity to respond positively to the new situation (Randall, 2009). However, there are plenty of benefits (besides the financial ones) of a low-carbon lifestyle e.g., health, community/social interaction - including the ‘intrinsic' goals mentioned below. It is important to be honest about both the losses and the benefits that may be associated with lifestyle change, and not to seek to separate out one from the other.¶ 3a. Avoid emphasis upon painless, easy steps. ¶ Be honest about the limitations of voluntary private-sphere behavioural change, and the need for ambitious new policy interventions that incentivise such changes, or that regulate for them. People know that the scope they have, as individuals, to help meet the challenge of climate change is extremely limited. For many people, it is perfectly sensible to continue to adopt high-carbon lifestyle choices whilst simultaneously being supportive of government interventions that would make these choices more difficult for everyone. ¶ The adoption of small-scale private sphere behavioural changes is sometimes assumed to lead people to adopt ever more difficult (and potentially significant) behavioural changes. The empirical evidence for this ‘foot-in-thedoor’ effect is highly equivocal. Some studies detect such an effect; others studies have found the reverse effect (whereby people tend to ‘rest on their laurels’ having adopted a few simple behavioural changes - Thogersen and Crompton, 2009). Where attention is drawn to simple and painless privatesphere behavioural changes, these should be urged in pursuit of a set of intrinsic goals (that is, as a response to people’s understanding about the contribution that such behavioural change may make to benefiting their friends and family, their community, the wider world, or in contributing to their growth and development as individuals) rather than as a means to achieve social status or greater financial success. Adopting behaviour in pursuit of intrinsic goals is more likely to lead to ‘spillover’ into other sustainable behaviours (De Young, 2000; Thogersen and Crompton, 2009).¶ People aren’t stupid: they know that if there are wholesale changes in the global climate underway, these will not be reversed merely through checking their tyre pressures or switching their TV off standby. An emphasis upon simple and painless steps suppresses debate about those necessary responses that are less palatable – that will cost people money, or that will infringe on cherished freedoms (such as to fly). Recognising this will be a key step in accepting the reality of loss of aspects of our current lifestyles, and in beginning to work through the powerful emotions that this will engender (Randall, 2009). ¶ 3b. Avoid over-emphasis on the economic opportunities that mitigating, and adapting to, climate change may provide. ¶ There will, undoubtedly, be economic benefits to be accrued through investment in new technologies, but there will also be instances where the economic imperative and the climate change adaptation or mitigation imperative diverge, and periods of economic uncertainty for many people as some sectors contract. It seems inevitable that some interventions will have negative economic impacts (Stern, 2007).¶ Undue emphasis upon economic imperatives serves to reinforce the dominance, in society, of a set of extrinsic goals (focussed, for example, on financial benefit). A large body of empirical research demonstrates that these extrinsic goals are antagonistic to the emergence of pro-social and proenvironmental concern (Crompton and Kasser, 2009).¶ 3c. Avoid emphasis upon the opportunities of ‘green consumerism’ as a response to climate change.¶ As mentioned above (3b), a large body of research points to the antagonism between goals directed towards the acquisition of material objects and the emergence of pro-environmental and pro-social concern (Crompton and Kasser, 2009). Campaigns to ‘buy green’ may be effective in driving up sales of particular products, but in conveying the impression that climate change can be addressed by ‘buying the right things’, they risk undermining more difficult and systemic changes. A recent study found that people in an experiment who purchased ‘green’ products acted less altruistically on subsequent tasks (Mazar & Zhong, 2010) – suggesting that small ethical acts may act as a ‘moral offset’ and licence undesirable behaviours in other domains. This does not mean that private-sphere behaviour changes will always lead to a reduction in subsequent pro-environmental behaviour, but it does suggest that the reasons used to motivate these changes are critically important. Better is to emphasise that ‘every little helps a little’ – but that these changes are only the beginning of a process that must also incorporate more ambitious private-sphere change and significant collective action at a political level.¶ 4. Empathise with the emotional responses that will be engendered by a forthright presentation of the probable impacts of climate change. ¶ Belief in climate change and support for low-carbon policies will remain fragile unless people are emotionally engaged. We should expect people to be sad or angry, to feel guilt or shame, to yearn for that which is lost or to search for more comforting answers (Randall, 2009). Providing support and empathy in working through the painful emotions of 'grief' for a society that must undergo changes is a prerequisite for subsequent adaptation to new circumstances.¶ Without such support and empathy, it is more likely that people will begin to deploy a range of maladaptive ‘coping strategies’, such as denial of personal responsibility, blaming others, or becoming apathetic (Lertzman, 2008). An audience should not be admonished for deploying such strategies – this would in itself be threatening, and could therefore harden resistance to positive behaviour change (Miller and Rolnick, 2002). The key is not to dismiss people who exhibit maladaptive coping strategies, but to understand how they can be made more adaptive. People who feel socially supported will be more likely to adopt adaptive emotional responses - so facilitating social support for proenvironmental behaviour is crucial.¶ 5. Promote pro-environmental social norms and harness the power of social networks¶ One way of bridging the gap between private-sphere behaviour changes and collective action is the promotion of pro-environmental social norms. Pictures and videos of ordinary people (‘like me’) engaging in significant proenvironmental actions are a simple and effective way of generating a sense of social normality around pro-environmental behaviour (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein and Griskevicius, 2007). There are different reasons that people adopt social norms, and encouraging people to adopt a positive norm simply to ‘conform’, to avoid a feeling of guilt, or for fear of not ‘fitting in’ is likely to produce a relatively shallow level of motivation for behaviour change. Where social norms can be combined with ‘intrinsic’ motivations (e.g. a sense of social belonging), they are likely to be more effective and persistent.¶ Too often, environmental communications are directed to the individual as a single unit in the larger social system of consumption and political engagement. This can make the problems feel too overwhelming, and evoke unmanageable levels of anxiety. Through the enhanced awareness of what other people are doing, a strong sense of collective purpose can be engendered. One factor that is likely to influence whether adaptive or maladaptive coping strategies are selected in response to fear about climate change is whether people feel supported by a social network – that is, whether a sense of ‘sustainable citizenship’ is fostered. The efficacy of groupbased programmes at promoting pro-environmental behaviour change has been demonstrated on numerous occasions – and participants in these projects consistently point to a sense of mutual learning and support as a key reason for making and maintaining changes in behaviour (Nye and Burgess, 2008). There are few influences more powerful than an individual’s social network. Networks are instrumental not just in terms of providing social support, but also by creating specific content of social identity – defining what it means to be “us”. If environmental norms are incorporated at this level (become defining for the group) they can result in significant behavioural change (also reinforced through peer pressure).¶ Of course, for the majority of people, this is unlikely to be a network that has climate change at its core. But social networks – Trade Unions, Rugby Clubs, Mother & Toddler groups – still perform a critical role in spreading change through society. Encouraging and supporting pre-existing social networks to take ownership of climate change (rather than approach it as a problem for ‘green groups’) is a critical task. As well as representing a crucial bridge between individuals and broader society, peer-to-peer learning circumnavigates many of the problems associated with more ‘top down’ models of communication – not least that government representatives are perceived as untrustworthy (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). Peer-to-peer learning is more easily achieved in group-based dialogue than in designing public information films: But public information films can nonetheless help to establish social norms around community-based responses to the challenges of climate change, through clear visual portrayals of people engaging collectively in the pro-environmental behaviour.¶ The discourse should be shifted increasingly from ‘you’ to ‘we’ and from ‘I’ to ‘us’. This is starting to take place in emerging forms of community-based activism, such as the Transition Movement and Cambridge Carbon Footprint’s ‘Carbon Conversations’ model – both of which recognize the power of groups to help support and maintain lifestyle and identity changes. A nationwide climate change engagement project using a group-based behaviour change model with members of Trade Union networks is currently underway, led by the Climate Outreach and Information Network. These projects represent a method of climate change communication and engagement radically different to that typically pursued by the government – and may offer a set of approaches that can go beyond the limited reach of social marketing techniques.¶ One potential risk with appeals based on social norms is that they often contain a hidden message. So, for example, a campaign that focuses on the fact that too many people take internal flights actually contains two messages – that taking internal flights is bad for the environment, and that lots of people are taking internal flights. This second message can give those who do not currently engage in that behaviour a perverse incentive to do so, and campaigns to promote behaviour change should be very careful to avoid this. The key is to ensure that information about what is happening (termed descriptive norms), does not overshadow information about what should be happening (termed injunctive norms). ¶ 6. Think about the language you use, but don’t rely on language alone¶ A number of recent publications have highlighted the results of focus group research and talk-back tests in order to ‘get the language right’ (Topos Partnership, 2009; Western Strategies & Lake Research Partners, 2009), culminating in a series of suggestions for framing climate-change communications. For example, these two studies led to the suggestions that communicators should use the term ‘global warming’ or ‘our deteriorating atmosphere’, respectively, rather than ‘climate change’. Other research has identified systematic differences in the way that people interpret the terms ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’, with ‘global warming’ perceived as more emotionally engaging than ‘climate change’ (Whitmarsh, 2009).¶ Whilst ‘getting the language right’ is important, it can only play a small part in a communication strategy. More important than the language deployed (i.e. ‘conceptual frames') are what have been referred to by some cognitive linguists as 'deep frames'. Conceptual framing refers to catchy slogans and clever spin (which may or may not be honest). At a deeper level, framing refers to forging the connections between a debate or public policy and a set of deeper values or principles. Conceptual framing (crafting particular messages focussing on particular issues) cannot work unless these messages resonate with a set of long-term deep frames.¶ Policy proposals which may at the surface level seem similar (perhaps they both set out to achieve a reduction in environmental pollution) may differ importantly in terms of their deep framing. For example, putting a financial value on an endangered species, and building an economic case for their conservation ‘commodifies’ them, and makes them equivalent (at the level of deep frames) to other assets of the same value (a hotel chain, perhaps). This is a very different frame to one that attempts to achieve the same conservation goals through the ascription of intrinsic value to such species – as something that should be protected in its own right. Embedding particular deep frames requires concerted effort (Lakoff, 2009), but is the beginning of a process that can build a broad, coherent cross-departmental response to climate change from government.¶ 7. Encourage public demonstrations of frustration at the limited pace of government action¶ Private-sphere behavioural change is not enough, and may even at times become a diversion from the more important process of bringing political pressure to bear on policy-makers. The importance of public demonstrations of frustration at both the lack of political progress on climate change and the barriers presented by vested interests is widely recognised – including by government itself. Climate change communications, including government communication campaigns, should work to normalise public displays of frustration with the slow pace of political change. Ockwell et al (2009) argued that communications can play a role in fostering demand for - as well as acceptance of - policy change. Climate change communication could (and should) be used to encourage people to demonstrate (for example through public demonstrations) about how they would like structural barriers to behavioural/societal change to be removed.

Simulation and institutional deliberation are valuable and motivate effective responses to climate risks

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Based on the observation that experiential and analytic processing systems compete and that personal experience and vivid descriptions are often favored over statistical information, we suggest the following research and policy implications.¶ Communications designed to create, recall and highlight relevant personal experience and to elicit affective responses can lead to more public attention to, processing of, and engagement with forecasts of climate variability and climate change. Vicarious experiential information in the form of scenarios, narratives, and analogies can help the public and policy makers imagine the potential consequences of climate variability and change, amplify or attenuate risk perceptions, and influence both individual behavioral intentions and public policy preferences. Likewise, as illustrated by the example of retranslation in the Uganda studies, the translation of statistical information into concrete experience with simulated forecasts, decisionmaking and its outcomes can greatly facilitate an intuitive understanding of both probabilities and the consequences of incremental change and extreme events, and motivate contingency planning.¶ Yet, while the engagement of experience-based, affective decision-making can make risk communications more salient and motivate behavior, experiential processing is also subject to its own biases, limitations and distortions, such as the finite pool of worry and single action bias. Experiential processing works best with easily imaginable, emotionally laden material, yet many aspects of climate variability and change are relatively abstract and require a certain level of analytical understanding (e.g., long-term trends in mean temperatures or precipitation). Ideally, communication of climate forecasts should encourage the interactive engagement of both analytic and experiential processing systems in the course of making concrete decisions about climate, ranging from individual choices about what crops to plant in a particular season to broad social choices about how to mitigate or adapt to global climate change.¶ One way to facilitate this interaction is through group and participatory decision-making. As the Uganda example suggests, group processes allow individuals with a range of knowledge, skills and personal experience to share diverse information and perspectives and work together on a problem. Ideally, groups should include at least one member trained to understand statistical forecast information to ensure that all sources of information—both experiential and analytic—are considered as part of the decision-making process. Communications to groups should also try to translate statistical information into formats readily understood in the language, personal and cultural experience of group members. In a somewhat iterative or cyclical process, the shared concrete information can then be re-abstracted to an analytic level that leads to action.¶ Risk and uncertainty are inherent dimensions of all climate forecasts and related decisions. Analytic products like trend analysis, forecast probabilities, and ranges of uncertainty ought to be valuable contributions to stakeholder decision-making. Yet decision makers also listen to the inner and communal voices of personal and collective experience, affect and emotion, and cultural values. Both systems—analytic and experiential—should be considered in the design of climate forecasts and risk communications. If not, many analytic products will fall on deaf ears as decision makers continue to rely heavily on personal experience and affective cues to make plans for an uncertain future. The challenge is to find innovative and creative ways to engage both systems in the process of individual and group decision-making.

Taking action against warming represents an opportunity to rebuild progressive politics for a more just society, but only if we set aside traditional differences founded around identity in favor of a broad-based coalition

Smith 10 Brendan, co-founder of Labor Network for Sustainability, 11-23, “Fighting Doom: The New Politics of Climate Change,” Common Dreams, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/11/23-1

I admit I have arrived late to the party. Only recently have I begun to realize what others have known for decades: The climate crisis is not, at its core, an environmental issue. In fact it is not an "issue" at all; it is an existential threat to every human and community on the planet. It threatens every job, every economy in the world. It threatens the health of our children. It threatens our food and water supply. Climate change will continue to alter the world our species has known for the past three thousand years. As an oyster farmer and longtime political activist, the effects of climate change on my life will be neither distant nor impersonal. Rising greenhouse gases and ocean temperatures may well force me to abandon my 60-acre farm within the next forty years. From France to Washington state, oystermen are already seeing massive die-offs of seed oysters and the thinning shells science has long predicted. I can see the storm clouds and they are foretelling doom. But my political alter ego is oddly less pessimistic. Rather than triggering gloom, the climate crisis has surprisingly stirred up more hope than I have felt in twenty years as a progressive activist. After decades of progressive retreat it is a strange feeling. But I am haunted by the suspicion that this coming crisis may be the first opportunity we have had in generations to radically re-shape the political landscape and build a more just and sustainable society. The Power of Doom The modern progressive movement in the U.S. has traditionally grounded its organizing in the politics of identity and altruism. Organize an affected group -- minorities, gays, janitors or women -- and then ask the public at large to support the cause -- prison reform, gay marriage, labor rights, or abortion -- based on some cocktail of good will, liberal guilt, and moral persuasion. This strategy has been effective at times. But we have failed to bring these mini-movements together into a force powerful enough to enact broad-based social reform. It takes a lot of people to change society and our current strategy has left us small in numbers and weak in power. The highlights of my political life -- as opposed to oystering -- have been marked by winning narrow, often temporary, battles, but perennially losing the larger war. I see the results in every direction I look: growing poverty and unemployment, two wars, the rise of the right, declining unionization, the failure of the Senate's climate legislation and of Copenhagen, the wholesale domination of corporate interests. The list goes on and on. We have lost; it's time to admit our strategy has been too tepid and begin charting anew. This time can be different. What is so promising about the climate crisis is that because it is not an "issue" experienced by one disenfranchised segment of the population, it opens the opportunity for a new organizing calculus for progressives. Except for nuclear annihilation, humanity has never faced so universal a threat where all our futures are bound inextricably together. This universality provides the mortar of common interest required for movement building. We could literally knock on every door on the planet and find someone -- whether they know it or not -- who has a vital self-interest in averting the climate crisis by joining a movement for sustainability. With all of humanity facing doom, we can finally gather under one banner and count our future members not in the thousands but in the millions, even billions. But as former White House "Green Jobs Czar" Van Jones told the New Yorker in 2009, "The challenge is making this an everybody movement, so your main icons are Joe Six-Pack, Joe the Plumber, becoming Joe the Solar Guy, or that kid on the street corner putting down his handgun, picking up a caulk gun." The climate crisis is carrying us into uncharted waters and our political strategy needs to be directed toward making the climate movement an "everybody movement." Let me use a personal example. As an oysterman on Long Island Sound my way of life is threatened by rising greenhouse gases and ocean temperatures. If the climate crisis is not averted my oysters will die and my farm will be shuttered. Saving my livelihood requires that I politically engage at some level. Normally I would gather together my fellow oyster farmers to lobby state and federal officials and hold a protest or two. Maybe I would find a few coalitions to join. But we would remain small in number, wield little power, and our complaints about job loss would fall on largely unsympathetic ears in the face of so many suffering in so many ways. And what would we even petition our government to do about the problem? Buyouts and unemployment benefits? Re-training classes? Our oysters will still die and we will still lose our farms. To save our lives and livelihood we need to burrow down to the root of the problem: halting greenhouse gas emissions. And halting emissions requires joining a movement with the requisite power to dismantle the fossil fuel economy while building a green economy. To tackle such a large target requires my support for every nook and cranny effort to halt greenhouse gases and transition to a green economy. I need to gather up my fellow oyster farmers and link arms with students blocking new coal-fired power plants while fighting for just transition for coal workers; I need to join forces with other green workers around the country to demand government funding for green energy jobs, not more bank and corporate bailouts; I need to support labor movement efforts in China and elsewhere to climb out of poverty by going "green not dirty." I have a stake in these disparate battles not out of political altruism, but because my livelihood and community depend on stopping greenhouse gases and climate change. In other words, the hidden jewel of the climate crisis is that I need others and others need me. We are bound together by the same story of crisis and struggle. Some in the sustainability movement have been taking advantage of the "power of doom" by weaving together novel narratives and alliances around climate change. Groups in Kentucky are complementing their anti-mountain top removal efforts by organizing members of rural electrical co-ops into "New Power" campaigns to force a transition from fossil fuels to renewable power -- and create jobs in the process. Police unions in Canada, recognizing their members will be first responders as climate disasters hit, have reached out to unions in New Orleans to ensure the tragedies that followed Katrina are not repeated. Artists, chefs, farmers, bike mechanics, designers, and others are coalescing into a "green artisan movement" focused on building vibrant sustainable communities. Immigrant organizers, worried about the very real possibility of ever-worsening racial tensions triggered by millions of environmental refugees flooding in from neighboring countries, are educating their membership about why the climate crisis matters. My hope is that over the coming years we will be able to catalog increasing numbers of these tributaries of the climate crisis. Our power will not stem from a long list of issue concerns or sponsors at events -- we have tried that as recently as the October 2nd Washington D.C. "One Nation Working Together" march with little impact. Nor, with the rise of do-it-yourself organizing, will our power spring from top-down political parties of decades past. Instead oystermen like me, driven by the need to save our lives and livelihood, will storm the barricades with others facing the effects of the climate crisis. We will merge our mini-movements under a banner of common crisis, common vision and common struggle. We will be in this fight together and emerge as force not to be trifled with. This Time We Have an Alternative I am also guardedly optimistic because this time we have an alternative. My generation came of age after the fall of communism, and as a result, we have been raised in the midst of one-sided debate. We recognize that neoliberalism has ravaged society, but besides nostalgic calls for socialism, what has been the alternative? As globalization swept the globe, we demanded livable wages and better housing for the poorest in our communities; we fought sweatshops in China; we lobbied for new campaign finance and corporate governance laws. But these are mere patchwork reforms that fail to add up to a full-blown alternative to our current anti-government, free-market system. Never being able to fully picture the progressive alternative left me not fully trusting that progressive answers were viable solutions. But when I hear the proposed solutions to the climate crisis, the fog lifts. I can track the logic and envision the machinery of our alternative. And it sounds surprisingly like a common sense rebuttal to the current free-market mayhem: We face a global emergency of catastrophic proportions. Market fundamentalism will worsen rather than solve the crisis. Instead we need to re-direct our institutions and economic resources toward solving the crisis by replacing our carbon-based economy with a green sustainable economy. And by definition, for an economy to be sustainable it must addresses the longstanding suffering ordinary people face in their lives, ranging from unemployment and poverty to housing and healthcare. For years I have tossed from campaign to campaign, but the framework of our new progressive answer to the climate crisis now provides a roadmap for my political strategy. It helps chart my opponents -- coal companies and their political minions, for example -- as well as my diverse range of allies. It lays out my policy agenda, ranging from creating millions of new green jobs to building affordable green housing in low-income communities. I finally feel confident enough in my bearings to set sail. The Era of Crisis Politics While building a new green economy makes sense on paper, it is hard to imagine our entrenched political system yielding even modest progressive reform, let alone the wholesale re-formatting of the carbon economy. But I suspect this will change in the coming years, with our future governed by cascading political crises, rather than political stasis. We are likely entering an era of crisis politics whereby each escalating environmental disaster -- ranging from water shortages and hurricanes to wildfires and disease outbreaks -- will expose the impotence of our existing political institutions and economic system. In the next 40 years alone, scientists predict a state of permanent drought throughout the Southwest US and climate-linked disease deaths to double. As Danny Thompson, secretary-treasurer of the Nevada AFL-CIO, told the Las Vegas Review Journal, the ever-worsening water crisis could be "the end of the world" that could "turn us upside down, and I don't know how you recover from that." As if that is not enough, these crises will be played out in the context of a global economy spiraling out of control. Each hurricane, drought or recession will send opinion polls and politicians lurching from right to left and vice versa. Think of how quickly, however momentarily, the political debate pivoted in the wake of Katrina, the BP disaster, and the financial crisis. As White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel famously said "Never let a serious crisis go to waste...It's an opportunity to do things you couldn't do before." While addressing the climate crisis requires radical solutions that cannot be broached in today's political climate, each disaster opens an opportunity to advance alternative agendas -- both for the left and right. While politicians debate modest technical fixes, ordinary people left desperate by floods, fires, droughts and other disasters will increasingly -- and angrily -- demand more fundamental reforms. While our current policy choices appear limited by polls and election results, in an era of crisis politics what appears unrealistic and radical before a storm may well appear as common sense reform in its wake. My generation has been raised in the politics of eternal dusk. Except for a passing ray of hope during the Obama campaign, our years have been marked by the failure of every political force in society -- whether it be political elites or social movement leaders -- to address the problems we face as a nation and world. They have left us spinning towards disaster. We can forge a better future. Climate-generated disasters will bring our doomed future into focus. The failure of political elites to adequately respond to these cascading crises will transform our political landscape and seed the ground for social movements. And if we prepare for the chaos and long battle ahead, our alternative vision will become a necessity rather than an impossibility. As a friend recently said to me, "God help us, I hope you're right."

The state is inevitable and an indispensable part of the solution to warming

Eckersley 4 Robyn, Reader/Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Melbourne, “The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty”, MIT Press, 2004, Google Books, pp. 3-8

While acknowledging the basis for this antipathy toward the nation- state, and the limitations of state-centric analyses of global ecological degradation, I seek to draw attention to the positive role that states have played, and might increasingly play, in global and domestic politics. Writing more than twenty years ago, Hedley Bull (a proto-constructivist and leading writer in the English school) outlined the state's positive role in world affairs, and his arguments continue to provide a powerful challenge to those who somehow seek to "get beyond the state," as if such a move would provide a more lasting solution to the threat of armed conflict or nuclear war, social and economic injustice, or environmental degradation.10 As Bull argued, given that the state is here to stay whether we like it or not, then the call to get "beyond the state is a counsel of despair, at all events if it means that we have to begin by abolishing or subverting the state, rather than that there is a need to build upon it.""¶ In any event, rejecting the "statist frame" of world politics ought not prohibit an inquiry into the emancipatory potential of the state as a crucial "node" in any future network of global ecological governance. This is especially so, given that one can expect states to persist as major sites of social and political power for at least the foreseeable future and that any green transformations of the present political order will, short of revolution, necessarily be state-dependent. Thus, like it or not, those concerned about ecological destruction must contend with existing institutions and, where possible, seek to "rebuild the ship while still at sea." And if states are so implicated in ecological destruction, then an inquiry into the potential for their transformation even their modest reform into something that is at least more conducive to ecological sustainability would seem to be compelling.¶ Of course, it would be unhelpful to become singularly fixated on the redesign of the state at the expense of other institutions of governance. States are not the only institutions that limit, condition, shape, and direct political power, and it is necessary to keep in view the broader spectrum of formal and informal institutions of governance (e.g., local, national, regional, and international) that are implicated in global environmental change. Nonetheless, while the state constitutes only one modality of political power, it is an especially significant one because of its historical claims to exclusive rule over territory and peoples—as expressed in the principle of state sovereignty. As Gianfranco Poggi explains, the political power concentrated in the state "is a momentous, pervasive, critical phenomenon. Together with other forms of social power, it constitutes an indispensable medium for constructing and shaping larger social realities, for establishing, shaping and maintaining all broader and more durable collectivities."12 States play, in varying degrees, significant roles in structuring life chances, in distributing wealth, privilege, information, and risks, in upholding civil and political rights, and in securing private property rights and providing the legal/regulatory framework for capitalism. Every one of these dimensions of state activity has, for good or ill, a significant bearing on the global environmental crisis. Given that the green political project is one that demands far-reaching changes to both economies and societies, it is difficult to imagine how such changes might occur on the kind of scale that is needed without the active support of states. While it is often observed that states are too big to deal with local ecological problems and too small to deal with global ones, the state nonetheless holds, as Lennart Lundqvist puts it, "a unique position in the constitutive hierarchy from individuals through villages, regions and nations all the way to global organizations. The state is inclusive of lower political and administrative levels, and exclusive in speaking for its whole territory and population in relation to the outside world."13 In short, it seems to me inconceivable to advance ecological emancipation without also engaging with and seeking to transform state power.¶ Of course, not all states are democratic states, and the green movement has long been wary of the coercive powers that all states reputedly enjoy. Coercion (and not democracy) is also central to Max Weber's classic sociological understanding of the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."14 Weber believed that the state could not be defined sociologically in terms of its ends\* only formally as an organization in terms of the particular means that are peculiar to it.15 Moreover his concept of legitimacy was merely concerned with whether rules were accepted by subjects as valid (for whatever reason); he did not offer a normative theory as to the circumstances when particular rules ought to be accepted or whether beliefs about the validity of rules were justified. Legitimacy was a contingent fact, and in view of his understanding of politics as a struggle for power in the context of an increasingly disenchanted world, likely to become an increasingly unstable achievement.16¶ In contrast to Weber, my approach to the state is explicitly normative and explicitly concerned with the purpose of states, and the democratic basis of their legitimacy. It focuses on the limitations of liberal normative theories of the state (and associated ideals of a just constitutional arrangement), and it proposes instead an alternative green theory that seeks to redress the deficiencies in liberal theory. Nor is my account as bleak as Weber's. The fact that states possess a monopoly of control over the means of coercion is a most serious matter, but it does not necessarily imply that they must have frequent recourse to that power. In any event, whether the use of the state's coercive powers is to be deplored or welcomed turns on the purposes for which that power is exercised, the manner in which it is exercised, and whether it is managed in public, transparent, and accountable ways—a judgment that must be made against a background of changing problems, practices, and under- standings. The coercive arm of the state can be used to "bust" political demonstrations and invade privacy. It can also be used to prevent human rights abuses, curb the excesses of corporate power, and protect the environment.¶ In short, although the political autonomy of states is widely believed to be in decline, there are still few social institution that can match the same degree of capacity and potential legitimacy that states have to redirect societies and economies along more ecologically sustainable lines to address ecological problems such as global warming and pollution, the buildup of toxic and nuclear wastes and the rapid erosion of the earth's biodiversity. States—particularly when they act collectively—have the capacity to curb the socially and ecologically harmful consequences of capitalism. They are also more amenable to democratization than cor- porations, notwithstanding the ascendancy of the neoliberal state in the increasingly competitive global economy. There are therefore many good reasons why green political theorists need to think not only critically but also constructively about the state and the state system. While the state is certainly not "healthy" at the present historical juncture, in this book I nonetheless join Poggi by offering "a timid two cheers for the old beast," at least as a potentially more significant ally in the green cause.17

# 2AC

## 2AC Clitique

The judge is a policy maker tasked with evaluating cost benefit policy analysis – key to maintain topic focus and predictability – the k moots the 1AC

Role of the ballot’s to simulate enactment of the plan – key to decision making and fairness

Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and **implement an alternative politics.** The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a **substantive policy discussion.** Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an **institutional lever** with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list. These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political **system as a whole**, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to **participate directly in politics themselves**; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48 Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishmento f a temporary parliamentaryco mmissiont o studye nergyp olicy,w hichf or the first time would draw all concernedp articipantst ogetheri n a discussiono f both short-termc hoicesa nd long-termg oals of energyp olicy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49T hese commissionsg ave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernizationa nd technicali nnovation in energy policy. Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurizationd evices. With proddingf rom the energyc ommission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and **by producing a** modernization **plan itself**, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection. III. Conclusion The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the **objections against particular projects** was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general. One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic. Parliamentary Politics In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to **formulate an alternative politics**, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry. Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program. This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. **On the other hand**, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The **lively debate** stimulated by grassroots groups and parties **keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda.** Technical Debate In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, **activists engaged in technical debate.** They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often **proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts** themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators. The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria. Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic. In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56 In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the **contribution of grassroots** environmental **groups has been significant.** As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues **has been tremendous**.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 **Policy concessions** and new legal provisions for citizen participation **have not quelled grassroots action.** The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

Governmental engagement is key – without policy the alt can never solve

McClean 01 (David, “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope” [www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm](http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm))

Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

Perm do both

Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

The ends justify the means

Isaac 2 – (Jeffrey, Professor of PoliSci @ Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD Yale, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” Dissent Magazine Vol 49 Issue 2)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law [it] can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

In the face of extinction you have to weigh consequences - outweighs all else

Bok 88 (Sissela Bok, Professor of Philosophy @ Brandeis University, 1988, Applied Ethical Theory, ed. Rosenthal and Shehadi, pg. 203)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through your actions a law-making member in a universal kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy,” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously – perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish. To avoid self-contradiction, the Categorical imperative would, therefore, have to rule against the Latin maxim on account of its cavalier attitude toward the survival of mankind. But the ruling would then produce a rift in the application of the Categorical Imperative. Most often the Imperative would ask us to disregard all unintended but foreseeable consequences, such as the death of innocent persons, whenever concern for such consequences conflicts with concern for acting according to duty. But, in the extreme case, we might have to go against even the strictest moral duty precisely because of the consequences.

This is particularly true for policymakers

Ignatieff 4 (Michael, Carr Professor of Human Rights @ Harvard, Lesser Evils, p. 18-19)

As for moral perfectionism, this would be the doctrine that a liberal state should never have truck with dubious moral means and should spare its officials the hazard of having to decide between lesser and greater evils. A moral perfectionist position also holds that states can spare their officials this hazard simply by adhering to the universal moral standards set out in human rights conventions and the laws of war. There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is relatively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases. What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and moral distinctions between these are clear in the abstract, abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice. Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standards is that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another.

Patriarchy is not the root cause of war.

Martin 90

Brian Martin. 1990. (Professor of Social Sciences in the [School of Social Sciences, Media and Communication](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/ssmac/index.html) at the University of Wollongong. “Uprooting War.” http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw10.html)

While these connections between war and male domination are suggestive, they do not amount to a clearly defined link between the two. It is too simplistic to say that male violence against women leads directly to organised mass warfare. Many soldiers kill in combat but are tender with their families; many male doctors are dedicated professionally to relieving suffering but batter their wives. The problem of war cannot be reduced to the problem of individual violence. Rather, social relations are structured to promote particular kinds of violence in particular circumstances. While there are some important connections between individual male violence and collective violence in war (rape in war is a notable one), these connections are more symptoms than causes of the relationship between patriarchy and other war-linked structures.

Patterson concludes her work doesn’t examine from race, class, gender, sexual orientation enough—a Black feminist epistemology solves best—this turns the K

Patterson, 13 - Master of Arts in Sociology from UNO (Ashly, "The Menstrual Body," May 2013, <http://scholarworks.uno.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2674&context=td>. EJW.

With this in mind, it is important to stress that being a menstrual activist does not have to entail going to extremes, like ecstatically looking forward to the next month’s cycle, or creating art with menstrual blood. While there is nothing wrong with these forms of menstrual activism, menstrual advocacy can also take a more subtle form, such as in becoming “period positive” (Green 2013). Being “period positive” reflects an understanding that when we, as a society, indoctrinate pubescent girls into the culture of menstrual stigma, medicalized discourse, and menstrual consumerism; we are socializing girls to be accepting of messages that their bodies are somehow naturally inferior to that of male bodies, unclean, impure, dis-eased, and thus in need of bodily management that can only be procured through consumerism. In other words, being a menstrual activist with a “period positive” outlook can be as simple as recognizing that it is time to bring this negative menstrual narrative to an end and embrace an open and honest, realistic menstrual dialogue. It is recognizing that developing a menstrual consciousness is a method through which women and men come to acknowledge and accept that menstruation is a part of a normal biological process that some bodies experience. Thus, being “period positive” is an avenue through which we learn to socially de-stigmatize menstruation by accepting that this¶ 85¶ body process is not a curse, it is not offensive, and it is not in any way indicative of a physical or psychological illness.¶ The Menstrual Body: Conclusion¶ In concluding I want to emphasize that I do not intend for this work on menstruation to be read as promoting an essentialist understanding of women based on menstruation, nor is it meant to idealize or glamourize the menses. I am cognizant of the fact that not all women menstruate; I for one fall into this category. I am also fully aware that menstruation can at times be painful and thus not always an overwhelmingly enjoyable or rewarding experience; a lived knowledge that I remember vividly. However, while this work has made strides in bringing menstruation “out of the closet” and into the public domain in order to facilitate a feminist theoretical and sociohistorical understanding of menstruation, I recognize that many stones have been left unturned (Young quoted in Docherty 2010)¶ In particular, **this work on the menstrual body has not adequately addressed the** complex **intersections of race, class, or sexual orientation**. No doubt, when I found literature and research studies on how women of different races and classes experience and deal with menstruation, I interwove **this material into the thesis. However, this resulted in a kind of “add on” approach, rather than one that starts from the margins – or from women in subjugated class and race positions - to develop feminist theory as intersectionality theorists,** such as bell hooks suggest (hooks, 1984). **Nor have I adequately examined** if and **how lesbian women or those who identify as transgender experience their menses differently** from heterosexual women precisely because much of the literature and research to date is based on heteronormative assumptions. As a result of these shortcomings, **this thesis** also **has not delved into** **how menstrual activism may differ when undertaken by activists** **in** various and **diverse social locations**. These flaws in my research cry out for more intersectional research and point to the various ways future work could enhance the analysis presented here. Indeed, **examining** in depth **the differences between women in terms of the intersections of race, class, gender, and sexual orientation would aid in** illuminating various vantage points and **experiences** **in** regard to **menstruation** **that may shed new light on how menstrual discourses are created, maintained, and resisted**.

Focus on gender as a basis of oppression subordinates factors of class and race is oppressive in itself—turns the K—no solvency

(Julie McCrossin is a self-identified lesbian and feminist. “Women, wimmin, womyn, womin, whippets - On Lesbian Separatism.” *Radical Tradition: A Takver’s Initiative.* March 30, 1999. <http://www.takver.com/history/womyn.htm>. EJW.)

McCrossin ‘99

Patriarchy. Separatists assert that patriarchy is the fundamental cause of all oppression in our society. It is the sum total of means by which men maintain dominance over women. In a patriarchal analysis men are identified as the enemy and the creators of all other divisions and inequalities throughout history. "Women's oppression predates and is the root cause of all others."( 2) I get the impression that all men, each individual man, benefits and thus all men are responsible. All men are considered guilty and all women are considered innocent.¶ A Sydney woman I interviewed felt that there had been two camps from the word go - socialist feminists, who see economic causes as the root of our oppression, and radical feminists, who see patriarchy as the cause. She said "Women have never had any power and have always been ruled by men. Out of that comes class, race and economic divisions. Women have no say and have always been oppressed in some way."¶ As a British woman puts it "I know what it is and who it is that oppresses me most, each time I walk outside my front door. Its not capitalism, its not class structure, its not other women, its men . . . No woman is to blame because none of us had the power to create these structures."( 3)¶ "Lesbian separatism" is **assert**ing **that** sex/gender is the basic division in our society. All **other** **inequalities are subordinate** side-effects. **Faced with a complex world, such a suggestion may be appealing in its simplicity.** It invites direct and radical solutions. But **it just isn't that simple. Class and race are equally significant. To fully understand** a society **we need to work out the relationship between sex, class and race based divisions,** and to consider them in the context of the particular culture and historical period.¶ **Any movement for social change which chooses to focus on one basis of oppression and to downgrade the significance of the others, is bound to be** misleading and oppressive **itself.¶** The impact of feminism this century has been to point out to working class based movements their failure to fully acknowledge the significance and to fight to remove sex based oppression. Separatist ideas appear to have swung the other way. It is easier to see the man whistling from the car than it is to see class structure. But I am often aware when I walk out my front door of the advantages I experience as a middle class white in Australia. **Socio-economic background and racial origin, as well as gender, fundamentally influence** the educational opportunities, work options and life expectations of **women and men.¶ I can only attempt to understand the problems of a black woman struggling** to help free her people **from white, imperialist domination** and **to create a** new **more equal society** - whether its in Australia or South Africa. **I wouldn't presume to tell her what her priorities should be. But** it is clear that the maintenance of her peoples' culture and identity, and the opportunity for economic independence, are necessary for her full liberation as a woman.¶ There is a thread running through"Lesbian separatist" thought that attempts to absolve women from any responsibility for the way the world is, "No woman is to blame because none of us had the power to create these structures." This view of history delegates women to a politically passive and impotent role. It reveals how misleading an analysis is which ignores other significant factors. Female members of ruling elites or dominant races have influenced and actively participated in the economic lives of societies.¶ For some "separatists" involvement in groups who are active around issues which are not specifically related to women, is at best a waste of time, and at worst collusion with the enemy.¶ This attitude can lead "separatist" women to exclude themselves from participation in struggles or around causes in which men are active. Thus the opportunity to become aware of common problems or the way other people see things is lost. Many of my political ideas and attitudes to people have been moulded through active participation. Separatist ideas would seem to lead inevitably to a narrowing of outlook and to facilitate the maintenance of pure and rigid views.

The alt’s all-or-nothing choice fails --- small reforms like the plan are key to institutional change and getting others to sign on to the alt

Erik Olin Wright 7, Vilas Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, “Guidelines for Envisioning Real Utopias”, Soundings, April, www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf

5. Waystations¶ The final guideline for discussions of envisioning real utopias concerns the importance of waystations. The central problem of envisioning real utopias concerns the **viability of institutional alternatives** that embody emancipatory values, but the practical achievability of such institutional designs often **depends upon the existence of smaller steps**, intermediate institutional innovations **that move us in the right direction but only partially embody these values.** Institutional proposals which have an **all-or-nothing quality** to them are both **less likely to be adopted in the first place, and may pose more difficult transition-cost problems** if implemented. The catastrophic experience of Russia in the “shock therapy” approach to market reform is historical testimony to this problem.¶ Waystations are a difficult theoretical and practical problem because there are many instances in which partial reforms may have very different consequences than full- bodied changes. Consider the example of unconditional basic income. Suppose that a very limited, below-subsistence basic income was instituted: not enough to survive on, but a grant of income unconditionally given to everyone. One possibility is that this kind of basic income would act mainly as a subsidy to employers who pay very low wages, since now they could attract more workers even if they offered below poverty level¶ earnings. There may be good reasons to institute such wage subsidies, but they would not generate the positive effects of a UBI, and therefore might not function as a stepping stone.¶ What we ideally want, therefore, are **intermediate reforms** that have two main properties: first, they concretely **demonstrate the virtues of the fuller program of transformation, so they contribute to the ideological battle of convincing people that the alternative is credible and desirable;** and second, they **enhance the capacity for action of people**, increasing their ability to push further in the future. Waystations that increase popular participation and **bring people together in problem-solving deliberations** for collective purposes are particularly salient in this regard. This is what in the 1970s was called “nonreformist reforms”: reforms that are **possible within existing institutions** and that **pragmatically solve real problems** while at the same time **empowering people in ways which** **enlarge their scope of action in the future.**

Double bind- either the alt defines a genderless subject or it essentializes - both are counterproductive and nonsensical for their political action

Linda Alcoff, Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College/CUNY Graduate Center, 1988, “Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory,” PK

Lauretis's main thesis is that subjectivity, that is, what one "per- ceives and comprehends as subjective," is constructed through a continuous process, an ongoing constant renewal based on an interaction with the world, which she defines as experience: "And thus [subjectivity] is produced not by external ideas, values, or material causes, but by one's personal, subjective engagement in the practices, discourses, and institutions that lend significance (value, meaning, and affect) to the events of the world."42 This is the process through which one's subjectivity becomes en-gendered. But describing the subjectivity that emerges is still beset with dif- ficulties, principally the following: "The feminist efforts have been more often than not caught in the logical trap set up by [a] paradox. Either they have assumed that 'the subject,' like 'man,' is a generic term, and as such can designate equally and at once the female and male subjects, with the result of erasing sexuality and sexual dif- ference from subjectivity. Or else they have been obliged to resort to an oppositional notion of 'feminine' subject defined by silence, negativity, a natural sexuality, or a closeness to nature not compro- mised by patriarchal culture."43 Here again is spelled out the di- lemma between a post-structuralist genderless subject and a cultural feminist essentialized subject. As Lauretis points out, the latter alternative is constrained in its conceptualization of the female sub- ject by the very act of distinguishing female from male subjectivity. This appears to produce a dilemma, for if we de-gender subjectivity, we are committed to a generic subject and thus undercut feminism, while on the other hand if we define the subject in terms of gender, articulating female subjectivity in a space clearly distinct from male subjectivity, then we become caught up in an oppositional dichotomy controlled by a misogynist discourse. A gender-bound subjec- tivity seems to force us to revert "women to the body and to sexuality as an immediacy of the biological, as nature."44 For all her insistence on a subjectivity constructed through practices, Lauretis is clear that that conception of subjectivity is not what she wishes to pro- pose. A subjectivity that is fundamentally shaped by gender appears to lead irrevocably to essentialism, the posing of a male/female opposition as universal and ahistorical. A subjectivity that is not fundamentally shaped by gender appears to lead to the conception of a generic human subject, as if we could peel away our "cultural" layers and get to the real root of human nature, which turns out to be genderless. Are these really our only choices?

Feminism relies on an essential an universal women that reinforces the same stereotypes produced under patriarchy—this turns the K

Witworth 94 prof of political science and female studies @ York U, 94 (Feminism and International Relations, pg 20, 1994)

Even when not concerned with mothering as such, much of the politics that emerge from radical feminism within IR depend on a ‘re-thinking’ from the perspective of women. What is left unexplained is how simply thinking differently will alter the material realities of relations of domination between men and women. Structural (patriarchal) relations are acknowledged, but not analysed in radical feminism’s reliance on the experiences, behaviours and perceptions of ‘women’. As Sandra Harding notes, the essential and universal ‘man’, long the focus of feminist critiques, has merely been replaced here with the essential and universal ‘woman’. And indeed, that notion of ‘woman’ not only ignores important differences amongst women, but it also reproduces exactly the stereotypical vision of women and men, masculine and feminine, that has been produced under patriarchy. Those women who do not fit the mould – who, for example, take up arms in military struggle – are quickly dismissed as expressing ‘negative’ or ‘inauthentic’ feminine values (the same accusation is more rarely made against men). In this way, it comes as no surprise when mainstream IR theorists such as Robert Reohane happily embrace the tenets of radical feminism. It requires little in the way of re-thinking or movement from accepted and comfortable assumptions about stereotypes. Radical feminists find themselves defending the same account of women as nurturing, pacifist, submissive mothers as men do under patriarchy, anti-feminists and the New Right. As some writers suggest, this in itself should give feminists pause to reconsider this position.

Feminism’s attempt to establish a universal force of patriarchy ignores the intersectionality of our identities – WE need to have a intersectional approach like black fem to solve oppression

Butler 99 (Judith, 1999 Gender Trouble: Feminism and the subversion of Identity, Kindle Version) sjb p.6-7

Apart from the foundationalist fictions that support the notion of the subject, however, there is the political problem that feminism encounters in the assumption that the term women denotes a common identity. Rather than a stable signifier that commands the assent of those whom it purports to describe and represent, women, even in the plural, has become a troublesome term, a site of contest, a cause for anxiety. As Denise Riley’s title suggests, Am I That Name? is a question produced by the very possibility of the name’s multiple significations.3 If one “is” a woman, that is surely not all one is; the term fails to be exhaustive, not because a pregendered “person” transcends the specific paraphernalia of its gender, but because gender is not always constituted coherently or consistently in different historical contexts, and because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional modalities of discursively constituted identities. As a result, it becomes impossible to separate out “gender” from the political and cultural intersections in which it is invariably produced and maintained. The political assumption that there must be a universal basis for feminism, one which must be found in an identity assumed to exist cross-culturally, often accompanies the notion that the oppression of women has some singular form discernible in the universal or hegemonic structure of patriarchy or masculine domination. The notion of a universal patriarchy has been widely criticized in recent years for its failure to account for the workings of gender oppression in the concrete cultural contexts in which it exists. Where those various contexts have been consulted within such theories, it has been to find “examples” or “illustrations” of a universal principle that is assumed from the start. That form of feminist theorizing has come under criticism for its efforts to colonize and appropriate non-Western cultures to support highly Western notions of oppression, but because they tend as well to construct a “Third World” or even an “Orient” in which gender oppression is subtly explained as symptomatic of an essential, non-Western barbarism. The urgency of feminism to establish a universal status for patriarchy in order to strengthen the appearance of feminism’s own claims to be representative has occasionally motivated the shortcut to a categorial or fictive universality of the structure of domination, held to produce women’s common subjugated experience. Read more at location 568

Their type of Feminism’s attempts to create a stable subject of the “seamless” woman leads to significant misrepresentation – black fem solves this

Butler 99 (Judith, 1999 Gender Trouble: Feminism and the subversion of Identity, Kindle Version) sjb p.7-8

Although the claim of universal patriarchy no longer enjoys the kind of credibility it once did, the notion of a generally shared conception of “women,” the corollary to that framework, has been much more difficult to displace. Certainly, there have been plenty of debates: Is there some commonality among “women” that preexists their oppression, or do “women” have a bond by virtue of their oppression alone? Is there a specificity to women’s cultures that is independent of their subordination by hegemonic, masculinist cultures? Are the specificity and integrity of women’s cultural or linguistic practices always specified against and, hence, within the terms of some more dominant cultural formation? If there is a region of the “specifically feminine,” one that is both differentiated from the masculine as such and recognizable in its difference by an unmarked and, hence, presumed universality of “women”? The masculine/feminine binary constitutes not only the exclusive framework in which that specificity can be recognized, but in every other way the “specificity” of the feminine is once again fully decontextualized and separated off analytically and politically from the constitution of class, race, ethnicity, and other axes of power relations that both constitute “identity” and make the singular notion of identity a misnomer. My suggestion is that the presumed universality and unity of the subject of feminism is effectively undermined by the constraints of the representational discourse in which it functions. Indeed, the premature insistence on a stable subject of feminism, understood as a seamless category of women, inevitably generates multiple refusals to accept the category. These domains of exclusion reveal the coercive and regulatory consequences of that construction, even when the construction has been elaborated for emancipatory purposes. Indeed, the fragmentation within feminism and the paradoxical opposition to feminism from “women” whom feminism claims to represent suggest the necessary limits of identity politics. The suggestion that feminism can seek wider representation for a subject that it itself constructs has the ironic consequence that feminist goals risk failure by refusing to take account of the constitutive powers of their own representational claims. This problem is not ameliorated through an appeal to the category of women for merely “strategic” purposes, for strategies always have meanings that exceed the purposes for which they are intended. In this case, exclusion itself might qualify as such an unintended yet consequential meaning. By conforming to a requirement of representational politics that feminism articulate a stable subject, feminism thus opens itself to charges of gross misrepresentation.

Focusing on representation in feminism only makes sense when we move away from the term woman and create a form of identity outside of the hierarchal system of oppression

Butler 99 (Judith, 1999 Gender Trouble: Feminism and the subversion of Identity, Kindle Version) sjb

Obviously, the political task is not to refuse representational politics—as if we could. The juridical structures of language and politics constitute the contemporary field of power; hence, there is no position outside this field, but only a critical genealogy of its own legitimating practices. As such, the critical point of departure is the historical present, as Marx put it. And the task is to formulate within this constituted frame a critique of the categories of identity that contemporary juridical structures engender, naturalize, and immobilize. Perhaps there is an opportunity at this juncture of cultural politics, a period that some would call “postfeminist,” to reflect from within a feminist perspective on the injunction to construct a subject of feminism. Within feminist political practice, a radical rethinking of the ontological constructions of identity appears to be necessary in order to formulate a representational politics that might revive feminism on other grounds. On the other hand, it may be time to entertain a radical critique that seeks to free feminist theory from the necessity of having to construct a single or abiding ground which is invariably contested by those identity positions or anti-identity positions that it invariably excludes. Do the exclusionary practices that ground feminist theory in a notion of “women” as subject paradoxically undercut feminist goals to extend its claims to “representation”?5 Perhaps the problem is even more serious. Is the construction of the category of women as a coherent and stable subject an unwitting regulation and reification of gender relations? And is not such a reification precisely contrary to feminist aims? To what extent does the category of women achieve stability and coherence only in the context of the heterosexual matrix?6 If a stable notion of gender no longer proves to be the foundational premise of feminist politics, perhaps a new sort of feminist politics is now desirable to contest the very reifications of gender and identity, one that will take the variable construction of identity as both a methodological and normative prerequisite,

if not a political goal. To trace the political operations that produce and conceal what qualifies as the juridical subject of feminism is precisely the task of a feminist genealogy of the category of women. In the course of this effort to question “women” as the subject of feminism, the unproblematic invocation of that category may prove to preclude the possibility of feminism as a representational politics. What sense does it make to extend representation to subjects who are constructed through the exclusion of those who fail to conform to unspoken normative requirements of the subject? What relations of domination and exclusion are inadvertently sustained when representation becomes the sole focus of politics? The identity of the feminist subject ought not to be the foundation of feminist politics, if the formation of the subject takes place within a field of power regularly buried through the assertion of that foundation. Perhaps, paradoxically, “representation” will be shown to make sense for feminism only when the subject of “women” is nowhere presumed.

Ballot commodification disad – pick selective parts of the poem which give them the ballot

Bryant 13—philosophy prof at Collin College (Levi, The Paradox of Emancipatory Political Theory, <http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/05/31/the-paradox-of-emancipatory-political-theory/>)

There’s a sort of Hegelian contradiction at the heart of all academic political theory that has pretensions of being emancipatory. In a nutshell, the question is that of how this theory can avoid being a sort of commodity. Using Hegel as a model, this contradiction goes something like this: emancipatory political theory says it’s undertaken for the sake of emancipation from x. Yet with rare exceptions, it is only published in academicjournals that few have access to, in a jargon that only other academics or the highly literate can understand, and presented only at conferencesthat only other academics generally attend. Thus, academic emancipatory political theory reveals itself in its truth as something that isn’t aimed at political change or intervention at all, but rather only as a move or moment in the ongoing autopoiesis of academia. That is, itfunctions as another line on the CVand is one strategy through which the university system carries outits autopoiesis or self-reproduction across time. It thus functions– the issue isn’t here one of the beliefs or intentions of academics, but how things function –as something like a commodity within the academic system. The function is not to intervene in the broader political system– despite what all of us doing political theory say and how we think about our work –but rather to carry out yet another iteration of the academic discourse (there are other ways that this is done, this has just been a particularly effective rhetorical strategy for the autopoiesis of academia in the humanities). Were the aim political change, then the discourse would have to find a way to reach outside the academy, but this is precisely what academic politicaltheory cannot do due to the publication and presentation structure, publish or perish logic, the CV, and so on. To produce political change, the academic political theorist would have to sacrifice his or her erudition or scholarship, because they would have to presume an audience that doesn’t have a high falutin intellectual background in Hegel, Adorno, Badiou, set theory, Deleuze, Lacan, Zizek, Foucault (who is one of the few that was a breakaway figure), etc. They would also have to adopt a different platform of communication. Why? Because they would have to address an audience beyond the confines of the academy, which means something other than academic presses, conferences, journals, etc. (And here I would say that us Marxists are often the worst of the worst. We engage in a discourse bordering on medieval scholasticism that only schoolmen can appreciate, which presents a fundamental contradiction between the form of their discourse– only other experts can understand it –and the content; they want to produce change). But the academic emancipatory political theorist can’t do either of these things. If they surrender their erudition and the baroque nature of their discourse, they surrender their place in the academy (notice the way in which Naomi Klein is sneered at in political theory circles despite the appreciable impact of her work). If they adopt other platforms of communication– and this touches on my last post and the way philosophers sneer at the idea that there’s a necessity to investigating extra-philosophical conditions of their discourse –then they surrender their labor requirements as people working within academia. Both options are foreclosed by the sociological conditions of their discourse. The paradox of emancipatory academic political discourse is thus that it is formally and functionally apolitical. At the level of its intention or what it says it aims to effect political change and intervention, but at the level of what it does, it simply reproduces its own discourse and labor conditions without intervening in broader social fields (and no, the classroom doesn’t count). Unconscious recognition of this paradox might be why, in some corners, we’re seeing the execrable call to re-stablish “the party”. The party is the academic fantasy of a philosopher-king or an academic avant gard that simultaneously gets to be an academic and produce political change for all those “dopes and illiterate” that characterize the people (somehow the issue of how the party eventually becomes an end in itself, aimed solely at perpetuating itself, thereby divorcing itself from the people never gets addressed by these neo-totalitarians). The idea of the party and of the intellectual avant gard is a symptom of unconscious recognition of the paradox I’ve recognized here and of the political theorist that genuinely wants to produce change while also recognizing that the sociological structure of the academy can’t meet those requirements. Given these reflections, one wishes that the academic that’s learned the rhetoric of politics as an autopoieticstrategy for reproducing the university discourse would be a little less pompous and self-righteous, but everyone has to feel important and like their the best thing since sliced bread, I guess.

# 1AR

## 1AR Clitique

They make the ballot a commodity that makes social transformation impossible

Bryant 13—philosophy prof at Collin College (Levi, The Paradox of Emancipatory Political Theory, <http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/05/31/the-paradox-of-emancipatory-political-theory/>)

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Alternative alone can’t solve – focus on tactics and strategy key

**Saloom JD UGA, 6**

Rachel, JD Univ of Georgia School of Law and M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies from U of Chicago, Fall 2006, A Feminist Inquiry into International Law and International Relations, 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 159, Lexis

Because patriarchy is embedded within society, it is no surprise that the theory and practice of both international law and international relations is also patriarchal. [98](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n98#n98" \t "_self) Total critique, however, presents no method by which to challenge current hegemonic practices. Feminist scholars have yet to provide a coherent way in which total critique can be applied to change the nature of international law and international relations. Some  [\*178]  feminist scholars are optimistic for the possibility of changing the way the current system is structured. For example, Whitworth believes that "sites of resistance are always available to those who oppose the status quo." [99](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n99#n99" \t "_self) Enloe suggests that since the world of international politics has been made it can also be remade. [100](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n100#n100" \t "_self) She posits that every time a woman speaks out about how the government controls her, new theories are being made. [101](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n101#n101" \t "_self) All of these theorists highlight the manner in which gender criticisms can destabilize traditional theories. They provide no mechanism, however, for the actual implementation of their theories into practice. While in the abstract, resistance to hegemonic paradigms seems like a promising concept, gender theorists have made no attempt to make their resistance culminate in meaningful change. The notion of rethinking traditional approaches to international law and international relations does not go far enough in prescribing an alternative theoretical basis for understanding the international arena. Enloe's plea for women to speak out about international politics does not go nearly far enough in explaining how those acts could have the potential to actually change the practice of international relations. Either women are already speaking out now, and their voices alone are not an effective mechanism to challenge the system, or women are not even speaking out about world politics currently. Obviously it is absurd to assume that women remain silent about world politics. If that is the case, then one must question women's ability to speak up, challenge, and change the system.